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10 May 1984

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IMPROVEMENT SEEN IN IRAQ-PDRY RELATIONS

Riyadh AL-YAMAMAH in Arabic No 793, 7 Mar 84 pp 40-41

[Article by 'Amir al-Jabiri: "Baghdad and Aden: Is It Start of New Relations"]

[Text] Radio Aden carried last week a small, and at the same time big, news item. It is small in terms of the space it occupied but big in terms of the indications and signals it has carried.

The item said that President 'Ali Nasir Muhammad has issued a decree approving the cultural, scientific and technical cooperation agreement between the PDRY and Iraq. This agreement had been signed in the Iraqi capital in 1978.

This is the space the item occupied. As for the meaning it harbors, it is greatly significant. It is enough that the news item indicates that there is a beginning for new relations between Baghdad and Aden--relations that turn over a page different from the page soiled by the attack on the Iraqi communist leader [not further identified] in the capital of the PDRY.

Since then, the relations between Aden and Baghdad have been openly discordant and this discord has led, among other things, to delaying the final ratification of the cultural, scientific and technical cooperation agreement throughout the 5 years that have passed since the agreement was concluded and its details drawn up.

It is true, and certain, that the attack against the assassination of the fugitive Iraqi communist in an Aden street was not the immediate reason behind the estrangement in the relations between Baghdad and Aden. However, the incident did explode the relations and expose the malady afflicting them. The fact is that there had been numerous reasons which later multiplied, especially in the wake of the said incident.

The fact is that it is not important to dwell now on the lean years in the relations between Baghdad and Aden. What is important is to look forward in order to explore the good and positive indications which are represented by the new signs with which we are all undoubtedly happy.

However, we cannot encompass the entire picture unless we link the new development in the relations between the PDRY and Iraq to its logical causes.

It is well known that Iraq has been taking for nearly 2 years a defensive position in its war with Iran which erupted at the end of 1980.

This position which has been taken by Iraq has gained it extensive support and sympathy at all levels. Even the United States, which says that it stands neutral vis-a-vis the war, has begun to speak recently in a tone inclined toward Iraq and its position.

The Soviet Union which engaged at the outset of the war in an ambiguous game implying that it was prepared to support and back Iran in the war with Iraq has again displayed in recent months the signs of disappointment in the complex and difficult Iranian situation.

If the United States has its own reasons which have motivated it to blame the Iranian side and to warn it against escalating the war--reasons focused in the security of navigation in the Strait of Hormuz and in the safety of oil exports through this strait--then the Soviet Union has other special reasons that motivate it to adopt a position inclined in favor of Iraq and of offering Baghdad more weapon deals, especially sophisticated aircraft and long-range missiles, such as the SS-12 which have a range of 800 kilometers and can hit Iran's heartland.

Moscow realized the failure of the game of seeking to ingratiate and befriend Tehran when the latter turned the tables and rushed in pursuit of the elements of Tudeh, the Iranian Communist Party, arresting these elements and beheading some of them.

Through the game of ingratiating and befriending Tehran, the Soviet Union sought to provide the opportunity to the Iranian Marxist current to spread and to move freely and flexibly under the slogan of alliance with the support for Khomeyni's regime.

But the process did not last long and Moscow has reconsidered its calculations and has begun to be inclined toward the Iraqi side because Tehran revoked the alliance with the local communists and accused them of lackeyhood and of plotting with the Soviets.

As the U.S. position will entail numerous positions, especially within the sphere of the western allies, the Soviet position will also entail similar positions in the arena influenced by the Soviets ideologically, politically and militarily.

But this does not apply to Aden. However, it is certain that growing sympathy and support for Iraq in the international arena, beyond the Arab and Islamic arenas, will inevitably change the positions of the closer circles, especially if they are Arab circles.

This is why the PDRY step ratifying the cultural, scientific and technical cooperation agreement with Iraq has come as a good initiative to revitalize the relations with Baghdad and to put them in a positive sphere characterized by interaction and by giving instead of estrangement, freeze and discord.

PDRY President 'Ali Nasir Muhammad's issuance of this ratification decree is considered an intelligent step which will have results surpassing the agreement's ordinary sphere and reaching farther, more comprehensive and more important horizons in the present and future relations between Aden and Baghdad.

8494

CSO: 4404/426

BRIEFS

SYRIAN OFFICIAL TO JORDAN--AL-MAJALLAH has learned that a prominent Syrian security official visited Jordan recently and held high-level talks on the relations between the two countries. The outcome of the talks has not been learned yet. However, Jordanian sources have said that King Husayn has not yet embarked on any initiative toward Damascus and that he is unlikely to resort to the Soviet Union in light of the faltering U.S. policy at the level of solving the Middle East crisis. [Text] [London AL-MAJALLAH in Arabic No 216, 31 Mar-6 Apr 84 p 3] 8494

INDUSTRIAL TRAINING PROGRAMS--Arab Industrial Development Organization continues to conduct training and development courses. Last March, the organization held in San'a' a training course on the preparation of economic feasibility studies and on evaluating industrial projects. Thirty representatives from the YAR, PDRY and Sudan are taking part in the course. It is to be noted that this course is being conducted within the framework of the training program prepared by the organization in cooperation with the ministries of industry in order to develop the technical cadres in the less-developed Arab countries. In cooperation with the Specialized Engineering Industries Institute, the organization has also conducted a training course on industrial quality control at the institute's headquarters in Baghdad. A number of specialized workers in the Arab countries have taken part in the course. In cooperation with the Management Development Center in the Sudanese capital (Khartoum), the organization will conduct a course on industrial management from 5-17 May 1984. Delegates from the five Arab countries of Somalia, Djibouti, the PDRY, Mauritania and the YAR will take part in this course. [Text] [London AL-TADAMUN in Arabic No 53, 7 Apr 84 p 60] 8494

SAUDI-FINANCED YAR HOSPITAL--Al-Bayda City Hospital, being currently built in the YAR at the expense of the kingdom [of Saudi Arabia], will be delivered by the end of this year. The costs of the hospital, with a capacity of 50 beds, amount to 17.65 million Yemeni riyals. It is the second biggest hospital built by the kingdom in the fraternal Yemen after al-Salam Hospital in the city of Sa'dah. Engineer Muhammad al-Musa, the director of the Office of Saudi Projects in Yemen, has stated that agreement has been reached with a Yemeni firm to complete equipping the hospital at a cost of 1.4 million riyals. Al-Musa has added that a contract has been concluded with a German firm to carry out maintenance work on the hospital equipment for a period of 3 years. [Text] [Riyadh AL-YAMAMAH in Arabic No 793, 7 Mar 84 p 22] 8494

CSO: 4404/426

PRIME MINISTER DISCUSSES UPCOMING ELECTIONS

Cairo AL-MUSAWWAR in Arabic No 3105, 13 Apr 84 p 4-12

[Interview With Prime Minister Dr Fu'ad Muhyi-al-Din by Makram Muhammad Ahmad; "Elections, Opposition and National Party Lists"]

[Text] Our dialogue went on for more than 3 hours. At about 2200, Dr Fu'ad Muhyi-al-Din had completed a full, busy day, like all his days at present. Only 45 days remain until the upcoming elections battle. Though the elections have now entered the list of his top concerns in his capacity as the National Party secretary general, his concerns as prime minister are still the same and have not diminished.

We completed our dialogue after midnight. We discussed the issue of the guarantees on which some opposition parties still insist despite all the assurances and all the precedents that leave no place for doubt that the upcoming elections will be a model of impartiality, and integrity.

We discussed the National Party lists, the reasons why the announcement of the lists has been delayed until now and the criteria taken into consideration while the party committee has been re-shifting the candidates throughout 40 meetings.

We discussed why it is impossible at present to separate People's Assembly membership from the holding of public jobs in the state.

We discussed the accusations directed by some opposition parties at the National Party, holding it responsible for undermining their conditions from within.

To put it briefly, our discussion covered all the questions raised regarding the upcoming elections which will enter Egypt's history as the biggest election battle in Egypt for more than 30 years, as the first election battle in the country enjoying the elements of impartiality and integrity and ultimately, as an election holding within its folds a referendum by the Egyptian masses on an important and fateful question:

With which will the Egyptian majority align itself: With its present and future, despite the problems raised? With its struggle that has gone on for 32 years on a path engulfed with difficulties in order that the country may regain its freedom in making its decision and in order that the simple citizen may regain his place on Egypt's soil?

With which will the majority of the Egyptian masses align themselves: With their present and future or with their past--a past wearing a multi-colored robe in which the visions are mixed and within whose threads the motives of nostalgia for a past that will not return and a revenge that will not take place are entwined?

Opposition's Demands Before Elections

[Question] Mr Prime Minister, I don't believe that anybody could disagree that the current National Party government can, with the upcoming elections, become one of the most outstanding governments in Egypt's modern history because it is leading a procession of democratic action that will, by necessity, influence our Arab world. This perhaps explains the broad international interest in the upcoming elections--an interest never enjoyed by the Egyptian elections for the past 30 or more years.

Despite this, the opposition parties still insist on the issue of guarantees.

The Wafd is demanding that the emergency law be suspended throughout the election period. It is also demanding that the election process continue for more than one day so that the members of the judiciary may be able, by virtue of their small number, to supervise all the subcommittees. Moreover, other opposition parties are demanding that there be full judiciary supervision that reaches the Ministry of Interior's General Committee.

[Answer] I will not conceal from you that I am amazed by the opposition's repeated talk about guarantees when we are in the final phase of preparation for the elections.

This ceaseless insistence on the issue of guarantees, though the guarantees are present, is not really intended for the guarantees themselves but for something else, namely to cast doubt on the government's way of acting. The opposition parties have been customarily employing this approach for some time.

I would like to say here that the current National Party government is shouldering before itself and before history the responsibility for the integrity of the election process. This is primarily a political responsibility shouldered by the entire government with all its agencies that supervise and take part in the election process. This government has supervised elections in more than 13 or 14 districts and these elections have been completely free and there is no cause whatsoever for anybody to imagine that the freedom and impartiality characterizing all these previous elections will change in the upcoming general elections on 27 May.

It is regrettable that this ceaseless insistence on a position which has become axiomatic should seek, among other things, to distort the face of the Egyptian administration and of its instruments without any cause or precedent justifying such distortion.

I would like to tell those demanding, without a real cause, the temporary suspension of the emergency law during the election period that the elections which have taken place in 13 or 14 subdistricts have all been held under the canopy of the emergency law and have been, by the testimony of all, free and clean. We have not employed the emergency law so that it may not be said that we have banned a meeting, confiscated a paper or objected to an article.

All the opposition papers are still issued regularly and without any intervention, loaded with their articles and criticism, and even slander.

I do not want to describe what is being written with more than this. Yet, we receive all this, whether in the government or in the party, with patience.

Even though a lot of what is published without examination or scrutiny comes under the jurisdiction of the law because it harbors indiscriminate accusations and intentional distortion of the facts, the lawsuits brought [by the government] before the judiciary have been few when compared with the number that should have been pursued against articles that surpassed the limits of criticism to reach the limit of defamation and vituperation with photographs, news reports and articles.

What is amazing is that all those who are asking for sufficient guarantees for the opposition do not ask themselves: How are all these meetings taking place, even at the village level and in the villages of the current deputies of the National Party, with the full protection of the police and security forces? There may have been some provocations in some of these meetings and attacks may have taken place in one or two of these meetings. But all this is detested and rejected by the National party government which insists that the security [agencies] protect the right of every candidate and every party to hold his meetings in any place he wants, even in the village of a current deputy.

The opposition could have avoided the chances of friction if it had not insisted on holding some of its meetings in the villages of current deputies. In Egypt, there are 5,000 villages and 30,000 hamlets and rural settlements that have not been covered by the parties' meetings. But now that the opposition has defined its wish, then it is the duty of the security agencies, on the instructions of the government, to protect the party that wants to hold its meetings in these villages.

Let us move to another point raised by the opposition, namely the issue of judiciary supervision. A decree was recently issued by the minister of interior to form the election committees under the chairmanship of a

magistrate at the level of main committees and subcommittees, and even at the level of the Ministry of Interior's General Committee which includes a judiciary element. So why are they demanding that the election process continue over a number of days, considering that I have enough members of the judiciary, in light of the current number of committees, to supervise the main committees and to follow up on the work of the subcommittees?

We have 23,000 election committees and it is unimaginable that magistrates head all these committees because there are less than 5,000 magistrates in Egypt. Does the solution lie in having the elections continue for 4 or 5 days? This has never happened in Egypt's history and nobody imagines that it can happen. I believe that the sound solution lies in enabling the magistrate to fully supervise his main committee and to follow up at the same time on its subcommittees. We are in the process of doing this now, especially since we revere the judiciary and hold them in high esteem. I believe that the recent promulgation of the judiciary authority law has endowed the judiciary with immunity, not to say sanctity, and has strengthened the public prosecution in an unprecedented manner. This law has evoked the appreciation and respect of the judiciary themselves and of Egyptian public opinion. Thus, the judiciary are taking part in insuring the soundness of the election process.

[Question] We understand from this that the judiciary will participate in the Ministry of Interior's General Committee, which is headed by an assistant minister?

[Answer] Yes. This committee has no connection with the vote count. This committee will receive the vote totals from the governorates and its task will be to add up these totals and calculate them according to the percentages set by the law.

How Will Ballot Boxes Be Transported?

[Question] The opposition has also raised the issue of transporting the ballot boxes from the subcommittees to the main committee, as if we will once again return to what happens in "Yawmiyat Na'ib fi al-Aryaf" [Daily Diary of Rural Deputy] in which the real boxes are replaced by other boxes stuffed with votes in advance.

[Answer] The boxes process and the other material processes involved in the transportation of the boxes by truck from the subcommittees and having a representative of the party travel with the boxes on the truck until they are delivered to the main committee--all these are procedural and organizational steps and I consider the opposition parties above talking of such measures.

Is it reasonable or imaginable that we will dump a box or replace it by another!

However, I say that if the opposition's thinking has reached this level, then there is nothing to prevent considering all these arrangements and measures because they are executive measures on which agreement can be reached. But to have a decree issued saying that no box can be transported without the presence of a representative from each of the six parties with lists [of candidates running in the elections] and that all six representatives must be riding the truck or the truck cannot move--to have such a decree issued is lamentable or laughable.

Government Response to Opposition Demands

[Question] We understand from this that it is possible to respond to some of these procedural demands even though they reflect doubts intended for the sake of doubts?

[Answer] What prevents us from issuing such a decree is that the decree will harm the Egyptian administration's reputation. This is what some opposition parties insist on and in an unacceptable manner. I regret that I am compelled to use this phrase. However, we are prepared to examine some of the procedural aspects under the canopy of the law that has been issued in order to provide the maximum procedural guarantees desired.

Apartments, Telephones, Bonuses and Elections

[Question] Mr Prime Minister, nobody can ignore your government's outstanding activity in this phase. Even one of the opposition leaders has said that the government has accomplished recently what could not be accomplished in years.

Houses and telephones have been distributed and decrees have been issued for the disbursement of bonuses and additional allowances, not to mention the fundamental amendments in the social security laws. I do not want to use the word "bribe," which is being used by the opposition currently. What concerns me in the issue is the question: Why has your government swerved from the general plan to meet demands that may perhaps be election demands primarily?

[Answer] Let it be clear to all that what is being currently implemented is the plan. We have not at all swerved from the plan insofar as investments are concerned. What has been accomplished in recent months, at least in my assessment as prime minister, has not exceeded in rates the accomplishments achieved in the 2.5 years constituting the current cabinet's life so far. I will cite numerous examples in this regard. When we say now that Egypt's electricity capacity rose in the past 2.5 years by dimensions completely equal to the increase in the preceding 10 years, then this does not mean that we accomplished this in the past few months because the accomplishment is an enormous one and it has been achieved in 2 years, not in a few months.

Another example is the judiciary authority law. This law has been the fruit of a long dialogue with the judiciary authority which lasted 1.5 years. The new social security law which provides reasonable pension and insurance guarantees after retirement was the subject of discussion and study over a period of many months which preceded the preparations for the elections. The issuance of this law is not connected with the elections. The bonuses, which we set at 5 pounds, were given last year and this was not the first time the [government] workers enjoyed such a bonus. Raising cotton prices was not a unique precedent this year. Last year, we raised the price for the farmer by 5 pounds per qintar of cotton. This year, we raised the price by 7 pounds. This increase comes, of course, as a result of the rise in sale prices and of the increased costs of cotton cultivation for reasons that we all know, of which the most important is perhaps the scarcity of farm labor.

Thus, there is nothing new to necessitate the opposition's panic. But at present, the opposition cannot see anything except from the angle of the election campaign. This is why it is saying that the government has accomplished in the few months preceding the election campaign what was impossible to accomplish in years. If the opposition followed sincerely and objectively the spheres of executive activity and the accomplishments made, it would find that the performance rates in the investments of the first year of the plan and the first half of the second year of the plan have proceeded at the same pace and by the same dimensions.

Finally, what I am interested in asserting is that the government has never swerved from the plan to meet election-oriented demands.

[Question] If there has been no swerving from the plan, then were there additional appropriations to meet these burdens?

[Answer] There was no need for any additional appropriations. The social security payments are made in installments from deductions taken out of the salaries of civil servants. We had been expecting the rise in cotton prices because we raise the prices of agricultural crops every year to enable the farmers to meet the burdens of the rising costs of farming. I think that you know that raising the prices of agricultural crops has been the subject of comprehensive study by the government for numerous months.

I reject this incorrect phrase used by the opposition about bribing the voters because these decisions meet the demands of the broadest masses, and this is the responsibility of the National Party government.

[Question] Mr Prime Minister, why the cotton farmers only? The rice and sugarcane farmers also complain of the imbalance between the prices of their crops and the rising costs of farming.

[Answer] You can convey on my behalf that we will reexamine the prices at which rice, sugarcane and wheat are purchased from the farmers. I believe that the issue is before the Policies Committee which will discuss it in its next meeting and will make immediate decisions in this regard.

Improving Conditions of State Employees

[Question] Beyond the sphere of the farmers, do we expect other similar decisions insofar as the other factions of society are concerned?

[Answer] We have raised the salaries of the government and public sector employees and of the special cadres. We have expanded application of the new social security law to include all the state and public sector employees because we believe they are the factions most heavily burdened in our society. We are exerting ceaseless efforts to make a relative improvement in their conditions.

[Question] Will this not saddle your government with numerous factional demands that are growing at present? I am referring here in particular to the demands currently raised by the faculties of the universities.

[Answer] It is a normal phenomenon for some factional demands to emerge during the elections period. This phenomenon always emerges with the approach of the elections date, motivated perhaps by the desire of these factions that the parties include in their programs promises to meet these demands. This happens all over the world.

Insofar as the faculties of the universities are concerned, we are in constant dialogue with them because our language under the canopy of democracy is the language of dialogue and of give-and-take. There is nothing to prevent us from responding to whatever is logical and reasonable. As for the illogical and the unreasonable, we reject it.

University Professors: Demands and Dialogue

[Question] May I ask a specific question: Which of the demands of the faculties of the universities do you view as logical and reasonable?

[Answer] The dialogue is going on and has been going on. Now, there are incentives, guidance [riyadah] allowances and nature-of-work allowance for the members of teaching faculties. Is the level of the incentives adequate or not and is it possible to raise it? Has it become logical to reconsider the bonuses paid for the correction of [examination] papers? The incentives, the nature-of-work allowance and the correction bonuses are now the subject of joint dialogue.

[Question] How about the cadre?

[Answer] We always establish the cadres, taking into our consideration linking them to each other. If you talk of one cadre, then what should our position be toward the other cadres? The link between the cadres is always on our minds. Despite this, we are, as I have already said, reconsidering the system of incentives for each group because the incentives are the result of excessive work, change of burdens and circumstances and increased productivity. All benefit from these incentives. For example,

I recall now that the incentive [appropriation] for the university teaching faculties was only 8 million pounds 2 years ago whereas it has now risen to 49 million pounds, i.e. it has risen sixfold or sevenfold.

[Question] Then you believe that the emergence of some factional demands in the election period is something normal as long as the dialogue goes on? What is important is that the matter remain within the sphere of dialogue and not turn into an instrument of pressure against the government?

[Answer] We do not at all accept the framework of pressure. Our dialogue with all these factions is established on trust. It is the government's idea to respond to what is fair and logical, provided that no faction is distinguished over the other factions.

Partisan Experience Between Ruling Party and Opposition

[Question] Frankly, are you satisfied with the National Party's leadership of the election process at present and can the National Party's leadership of the election campaign produce what we may call new traditions in a country where democracy has been absent for a long time and will the opposition parties help you achieve this?

[Answer] In fact, I am proud of the National Party's leadership of the election process, considering the young age of our democratic experience in multiple parties.

In the democratic world founded on multiple parties, there are old parties which have expertise, traditions of political action, the ability to act and to react and have their experience in the methods of democratic action. Measuring by the young age of our current democratic experience, we can say that this government is proud that it is facing four opposition papers that criticize and watch the government activities. The government is also facing, perhaps for the first time in Egypt, partisan meetings held at the broadest level and in a manner unprecedented for more than 30 years. If we have forgotten, we must recall history and recall the exceptional and abnormal measures taken by the [royal] palace and the occupation against any real democratic tendencies. I am proud because the government of the National Democratic Party gives each party under the provisions of the law and of the constitution, its right of meeting, free expression and of issuing its paper in the manner it wishes. I am also proud that the National party leaderships are actually present in the political street. The party has a broad and complete presence. The masses resort to the party and it moves. The party has its leaders and its base. However, nobody claims that we have reached the ideal situation, whether in terms of our political movement or in terms of the party's organization and structure. We still need time, experience, practice, efforts and sacrifice. However, I believe that out of its awareness that it is not the only party in the arena, our party has recently been more active and energetic. I believe that public opinion is aware of this.

The opposition is also trying. We understand its role of criticizing and attacking, though we aspire to see it rise above the methods of slander and defamation and of personal attacks.

I do not demand complete or alternative solutions for our problems from the opposition. I understand the opposition's role of criticizing and watching. All we ask for is objective criticism free of the methods of slander that do not rely on the truth or the law.

We wish the opposition would expose the flaws in the studies on projects, in determining priorities or in implementing projects. We wish the opposition would propose lively and modern methods in the spheres of planning, followup and of mapping our foreign policy. Regrettably, this has not concerned the opposition so far. What is preoccupying the opposition and surfacing at present is personal matters. Yet, we do not get upset with this.

Commodity Shares and Party Measures

[Question] Why does the opposition disseminate doubts regarding the National Party leaderships' dealings in cement [import] permits, bribes cotton [qutn al-'ara'is], commodity shares and poultry feed? Why doesn't the party stamp out such accusations with clear and frank measures?

[Answer] We do not keep silent on a devious person or on a suspicion. A number of members in a number of governorate have been expelled because they strayed from the path. Some have been tried by the courts and some have been expelled. But this does not mean that every National Party member exploits the cement permits or other permits. This is out of the question and untrue. If there is one devious member, then there are hundreds of members who are good citizens working for the interest of Egypt and of their party sincerely and faithfully. It is not right to generalize the negative qualities because if such qualities exist among some, they do not stick to all.

Prime Minister's District and Its Concerns

[Question] Even though Shubra al-Khaymah District is the prime minister's district, most of the textile plants in Shubra al-Khaymah are suffering from a large problem that has caused the partial stoppage of production.

[Answer] They [plant owners or managers] were with me recently and complained of the small quantities of yarn allocated for them. We have met with the officials concerned to increase the quantity of yarn allowed the private sector plants, considering that the public sector has its share. There have been other problems concerning the workers' relationship with the plant owners. Through dialogue, we have been able to find solutions to these problems.

Impartiality of Elections and Focal Point

[Question] Mr Prime Minister, you are perhaps aware that your district will be the subject of media attention. The Grouping Party has not disregarded this fact. This is why it plans to have one of its brightest stars run as a candidate in the same district, at least in pursuit of an exciting battle which would be followed by the world press. I believe that Shubra al-Khayamah District will be an important testing point of the government's impartiality in the upcoming elections.

[Answer] We welcome with all the political effort in our heart any competition in Shubra al-Khayamah District and in al-Qanatir al-Khayriyah. Shubra al-Khayamah will be a model of the impartiality of the elections, and we are happy with this.

Party Lists in Coming Elections

[Question] Let us ask you then: Why has the announcement of the National Party lists been delayed until now in what seems to be a tacit agreement among all the parties to delay their lists until the last moment for fear of change of positions and of a shift by individuals who have not gained a position in a certain list to other parties?

[Answer] The truth is that the reason for the delay is not that we fear that somebody may shift to another party. We are deliberate in selecting our lists and we seek to make sure of the popularity of our candidates in the districts through numerous means that measure the popularity of every candidate in his district.

[Question] Do you carry out special survey operations in the districts themselves?

[Answer] Yes, and we now have specialists who do this surveying according to scientific methods and with impartiality and honesty in order that we may get a true reading of the popularity of every candidate. In some cases, we repeat the measuring operation if we find in a district circumstances which we fear may affect the popularity of this or that candidate. Our ultimate goal is to find the strongest lists that attract the masses' votes because we do not want to impose on the citizens in any district anybody who is not close to the hearts and the votes of the masses.

[Question] To my knowledge, the latest committee entrusted with examining the National Party lists has held more than 40 meetings so far. What criteria do you take into consideration when evaluating any candidate?

[Answer] Popularity, good reputation and partisan commitment.

[Question] When a candidate's popularity and his good reputation clash, which criterion takes priority?

[Answer] We go by the order I have noted, namely: Popularity, good reputation and partisan commitment. This does not mean that popularity may overwhelm good reputation. You may come across an individual with good reputation but lacking in large-scale social relations in his district. Ultimately, the issue is one of a mixture of this and that. In the end, we reexamine the lists before we announce them to his excellency the president.

[Question] In a previous interview with AL-MUSAWWAR, you said that increasing the number of the People's Assembly members by 70 members will give the National Party a broader scope enabling its lists to include a considerable percentage of new elements. Will the National Party offer new faces in its lists because people perhaps like change, even for the sake of change itself?

[Answer] Change for the sake of change may be dangerous at times. However, we seek change for the better and I believe that we will present a considerable number of new faces.

What is important is that these faces be acceptable at the local level in the district, i.e. faces that enjoy a degree of horizontal popularity, as I call it.

Horizontal popularity is popularity at the level of the district and it is a very important element. At times, we find ourselves face to face with good and acceptable names that might be leaders in their field of specialization. When we measure the popularity of such names in their districts, the outcome is negative. So how could I risk including such names in a list?

New Faces in Party Lists

[Question] Suppose we ask you to mention to us the most prominent five new faces?

[Answer] It would be difficult to do so because we are still in the phase of review.

[Question] But you are certain that there is a considerable percentage of new faces in the lists?

[Answer] This is inevitable. There are 60 new faces.

[Question] Are they all from within the party or are there some from outside it? Are there among them faces known at the national level?

[Answer] All or some of these criteria are met by the new candidates.

Women Between Superficial and Real Activity

[Question] Insofar as the issue of women is concerned, a large percentage of women who enter the battle as women's representatives have been more strongly inclined toward superficial activity than toward real activity.

[Answer] Permit me to say that the current women deputies generally have tried sincerely during the preceding period to perform their party and social duties. There is no doubt that the presence of the female element is beneficial to the party and links the party with the enormous women's sector. Women are one half of society.

Without allotting seats for women (31 seats), it may not be possible for this number of women to be present in the People's Assembly because the number of women present in the current Assembly and gaining their seats outside the framework of the allotted women's seats is two women deputies only. The other women are present in the Assembly by virtue of the allotted seats. We review the names of the women insofar as popularity, not good reputation, is concerned because all the women present are of excellent reputation, God be thanked. We examine their positions insofar as popularity and their accomplishments in the previous Assembly are concerned. I do not believe that we are going to increase the number of seats allotted to women to more than 31 seats. It is true that the law permits such an increase but this number is enough.

Ministers and Upcoming Election Battle

[Question] Will all the ministers enter the election battle?

[Answer] Of course not.

[Question] On what basis is the determination made as to which minister enters the elections and which does not?

[Answer] This depends on the list.

[Question] Is each minister nominated as candidate in his native election district?

[Answer] Of course, every minister in his district. We have 16 ministers who are members of the Assembly. Engineer Sulayman Mutawalli, for example, is from Shabin. So why should I put him in another district? Dr Mustafa al-Sa'id is from Dayrab Najm. Why should I change the district from which he originally comes?

Governors and Issue of Running in Elections

[Question] Why have you tackled the issue of the governors with such extreme sensitivity that you have banned the governors from running in the elections?

[Answer] This is untrue. We do not ban the governors from running in the elections. A governor is banned by the provisions of the local government law from running in the elections. A governor may not compete in the elections unless he resigns his post. A [governorate's] general secretary and a city chairman may nominate himself. Governorship is the only position whose occupant may not compete in the elections.

Assembly Membership and Public Job

[Question] Isn't it time to separate the People's Assembly membership and the holding of official jobs?

Isn't it time to stop the practice of having ministers who have their private business?

[Answer] Insofar as the first part of the question is concerned, this is impossible in Egypt.

[Question] Why?

[Answer] Because we have more than 1.5 million workers and employees in the public sector and they represent a mainstay in production, it is unfair to deny the representatives of these people membership in the Assembly. It is also unfair to deny professors membership in the Assembly. How can I ask a university professor to leave the university in order to devote his time to the deputyship?

The law gives the civil servant the option of devoting his time to the deputyship or of combining the deputyship with the job if he occupies a higher management position. This means that a professor can continue to be a university professor and a deputy or a company chairman at the same time. People holding other jobs have to devote their time to the deputyship for a period of 5 years during which the deputy devotes his time to his work in the Assembly but during which he collects his salary and gets his promotions [as a civil servant].

If we fully separate the legislative assembly membership and the holding of public jobs, then we would deny this enormous segment of the public sector any presence in the Assembly. This may be applicable in a capitalist system where parliamentary membership is confined to lawyers, the free professions and the private sector [business] men.

Some of those who advocate the idea of separating the deputyship and the holding of public jobs base their call on the allegation that it is likely that the deputy may submit to pressures from his minister, with his ability to question, investigate and legislate being thus impeded. I believe that the element of pressure is out of the question because the option of the deputy to devote himself to the deputyship immunizes him against any likely pressures. I may even tell you that my position as a specialized minister perhaps enables me to have greater influence on the private sector people because a word from me may save a private sector activity or firm one million pounds.

Ministers and Their Private Businesses

[Question] How about the ministers and their private businesses?

[Answer] This is unacceptable and is prohibited by the provisions of the constitution.

Any minister directly or indirectly engaged in private business is in violation of the law.

[Question] Then why don't we implement the law?

[Answer] I am saying that this is impermissible and must be stopped.

Opposition Parties Accuse National Party

[Question] Some opposition parties accuse the National Party of seeking to destroy them from within.

[Answer] This is absolutely untrue. We have not interfered between the opposition parties themselves and we hold ourselves above interfering in the internal affairs of any of these parties. If some parties are suffering from internally destructive activities, we have not sought such activities and we are not happy with them. But insofar as the game of democracy itself is concerned, we have to engage in it with utter seriousness and without any courtesy as long as the game is within the bounds of the law and the constitution. I must try to strengthen my party so that it may gain the largest number of seats possible. I will not be courteous to anybody. But I do not hit below the belt, I do not harm the parties and I do not plot against them from within.

Stars of Other Parties and National Party

[Question] If this is the case, then why does the National Party try to lure away the stars and magnates of these parties?

[Answer] I have not sought any of those who have joined the National Party. They are the ones who seek us. Should I tell them no? If I say it, isn't it likely that they will head for another party?

I would like to assure all that the leaders that have joined us from some opposition parties--and you will find a number of them in the National Party candidate lists--came to us, offering to join the National Party. We have accepted them. But we have not plotted to lure them away from these parties.

[Question] But this policy has affected the other small parties so much so that the entire arena has turned into an arena for the National Party or for the New Wafd Party.

[Answer] Do you think that it is a party of my role to protect the big or small opposition parties? I do not protect this or that. If a member has lost his relationship with his original party and does not want to continue to be a member of this party, is it my duty to dissuade him?

If he is of a good leadership level, I welcome him because, I, as a party reflecting the 23 July and 15 May revolutions and the party of hope and of the future, can benefit from him and I consider him a bonus. So why should I let him go? Should I let him go so that others may put him in a position that may be delicate to me insofar as the election battle is concerned? I believe that such action would be a mistake from the party angle.

[Question] But the result is that the two main parties in the arena are now the National Party and the Wafd.

[Answer] I am not responsible for this outcome. Those responsible are the leaders of these parties that have driven away from them their most prominent elements.

[Question] In all parts of the world, some sort of understanding occurs between parties that are close in method and thought. Dialogue, understanding and, perhaps, a degree of joint coordination are established to confront the strongest and most dangerous party.

[Answer] In Egypt, such an understanding has not happened. If you are referring to the parties that consider themselves supporters of the July revolution, then the fact is that the sole concern of these parties' papers and meetings has been to defame the government and the National Democratic Party. They have displayed no single sign indicating the understanding you are talking about. So where could the dialogue come from?

Opposition and Criticism of Prime Minister

[Question] Why are the opposition parties intensifying their criticism against you at the personal level and do you get upset with this criticism?

[Answer] Absolutely not. However, public opinion notices that the emphasis is put on me personally in their meetings and their papers. I believe that this assault reflects their feeling of being in danger.

Despite this, I do not try to contain this assault and I am not affected by it.

May I tell you that they have exceeded the limits of criticism to reach the limit of trying to sow discord between myself and some National Party leaders in naive ways, of which the most evident is perhaps the attempt to highlight some of the party's other leader in an unacceptable manner.

Employee Transferred Because of the Wafd

[Question] Permit me to ask you about the circumstances under which a senior employee was transferred from the Ministry of Local Government to the specialized councils because he had joined the Wafd Party?

[Answer] I did not want to speak about individuals. However, this senior employee was in charge of an important sector connected with rural development and he had at his disposal vast appropriations pertaining to a number of vital projects in numerous villages. It seems this employee was not able to separate his party affiliation from his huge task. His partisan positions became tangled with the nature of his job and his relations with the minister in charge became complicated. The minister could no longer cooperate with the employee and requested his transfer. This is all we have done.

Change of Governors and Molehill Turned into Mountain

[Question] Why has the National Party given the opposition the opportunity to make a mountain out of a molehill by failing to announce the reasons for replacing the governors of al-Daqahliyah and Aswan?

[Answer] When a change is made in any of these high-level jobs, it is because of one of two possibilities: corruption or the inability to face the responsibilities.

Nobody can say that the first reason has been behind the changes made recently. The reason is that the two governors could no longer shoulder their responsibilities in these two positions with a high degree of efficiency.

When such a thing happens, do we have to issue public statements declaring this? If there was in the matter a suspicion of corruption, we would notify the prosecution. There is not the slightest suspicion insofar as these two men are concerned.

I would like to cite another example that has no connection with these two cases. When a cabinet reshuffle in which some ministers leave the cabinet takes place, is it necessary to say that they are unfit for the job?

Alliance Between the Wafd and Brotherhood

[Question] What is your opinion of the new alliances that have developed in the Egyptian political arena, meaning specifically the strange alliance established between the Wafd and the Muslim Brotherhood?

[Answer] I understand it when the alliance is between two legitimate parties that establish their alliance either on the basis of a permanent program with the aim of forming a government founded on the coalition of these two

parties or on the basis of a temporary program with the aim of waging the election campaign. I do not yet know if there is a specific program agreed upon by the Wafd, which is a party, and the Brotherhood group, which is not a party. What we have learned and what the two parties have declared is that a number of the Brotherhood leaders have joined the Wafd. Does this mean that they have taken off the Brotherhood's robe and become Wafdists or that the Wafdists shed their Safdist robe and become Brothers? We need more clarity insofar as this issue is concerned because the Brotherhood's robe is a well-known robe. It is not a party robe but a group robe. On the other hand, the Wafdist robe is a well-known party robe with a color totally different from the color of the Brotherhood's robe that we know.

But where is the program agreed upon by the Brotherhood and the party? This is something that has not been declared. Have the Brotherhood members become Wafdists so that they may be called Wafdists who believe in the message of Sa'd Zaghlul and Mustafa al-Nahhas and in the Wafd's old message as we have known it or in the Wafd's new message which is supposed at least to address the 23 July revolution as required by the parties law and by the constitution? Is this what has happened?

No Wafdist or Brother has yet revealed the true nature of what is sought and desired. This is my comment on this issue which needs further analysis and followup.

[Question] What are the motives for this alliance?

[Answer] I do not imagine there are any non-election motives. We have not included in our party other groups, parties or organizations. We have individuals. Our social structures may be varied. We have merchants, craftsmen, businessmen, workers and farmers. It is a varied structure of individuals within the party. This is what gives our party intrinsic strength and vitality and constant internal dialogue.

This is a different matter. Why should a party be tantamount to an alliance of different groups or parties? Such an alliance splinters and deteriorates rapidly.

This Alliance and Election Battle

[Question] Does this alliance make the election battle more difficult for the National Party?

[Answer] Not insofar as we are concerned. Our arena is clear and our bases are well known.

[Question] What results do you expect in light of the survey you have conducted, in light of the lists and in light of your firm knowledge of the arean?

[Answer] We leave this to God, may He be praised, because I do not want to anticipate the developments. However, efforts are being exerted in the sphere of partisan action with the objective of achieving the ideal. As a party reflecting the majority and because we consider ourselves the most capable and fittest party, our objective is to gain the largest number of seats possible.

[Question] It has been said that Dr Fu'ad Muhyi-al-Din expects no less than 84 percent of the seats to go to the National Party.

[Answer] To be honest, I have not defined my objectives in a certain figure or percentage.

I am striving to win every seat and always to achieve the maximum.

[Question] What will be the fate of the parties which will not win a single seat in the coming elections?

[Answer] It will be up to them to continue their political action. Naturally, a party that does not gain a single seat will prove to the public opinion its weakness and its failure to achieve the minimum percentage defined by the law (8 percent). However, these parties may continue their political action through their papers and their meetings and through expressing their opinions on occasions and in meetings. These parties will have the same offices they now have and will get the same subsidy they are now getting. This is not surprising because there are abroad numerous parties that have no seats in the parliamentary assemblies. Yet, such parties continue their political role.

AL-MUSAWAAR: We thank the prime minister for all this time he has given this dialogue despite his many concerns.

8494

CSO: 4504/245

MUSLIM ACTIVIST TRIED

East Burnham ARABIA: THE ISLAMIC WORLD REVIEW in English No 32, Apr 84 p 23

[Text]

Abd Assalam Yassine, a leading Muslim activist and magazine publisher-editor in Morocco, was arrested in Rabat on December 27, 1983 along with several other activists. A source close to his family told *Arabia* that Yassine was arrested following the publication of his new fortnightly newspaper *As-Subh*.

The fortnightly, which sold 7,000 copies in just two days, was set up under a licence granted by the local authorities. Ibrahim Ash-Sharqawi, a close collaborator of Yassine, was also arrested without charge.

The contents of *As-Subh* are apparently not as outspoken as previous articles written by Yassine in *Al-Jamaa*, another of his magazines. As soon as *As-Subh* was banned Yassine's colleagues published another newspaper, *Al-Khitab*, which was also seized and banned, and several of its distributors jailed.

Abd Assalam Yassine's trial began on January 23 but was postponed because of lack of evidence. He has for many years been outspoken about the social, economic and moral corruption of the Moroccan government. He has been harassed constantly for his views and writings. He was a member of a Sufi group called al-Buchisheen, with which he parted because of differences over policies.

Abd Assalam Yassine, who studied French and English while he was a teacher, rose to the post of inspector of schools, and after a few years became inspector general at the ministry of education. His demotion started when his Islamic dawa work became apparent and

disturbing to the regime. He was dismissed from his job in the early 1970s, accused of preaching Islah (religious reformism) in the country. This increased his determination to struggle against taghut.

In 1973 he wrote an open letter to King Hassan under the title "Islam or the deluge" in which he denounced the corruption and injustice prevalent in Moroccan society and challenged King Hassan to govern in accordance with Islamic teachings. The letter was banned and Abd Assalam Yassine was jailed for three years. In 1975 he started the magazine, *Al-Jamaa*.

Among his major works are *Al-Islamu Ghadan* (Islam Tomorrow) in Arabic, and *La Revolution a l'Heure de l'Islam* (Revolution at the Hour of Islam). In the former Yassine deals with the future of Islam, while in the latter he outlines the Islamic concepts of revolution. *As-Subh* and *Al-Khitab* are his latest publications. Recently, printers in Morocco were warned by the authorities not to print any magazines or books signed by Abd Assalam at the risk of imprisonment.

Abd Assalam and the other Muslim activists, who have been held in Meshta prison in Rabat, appeared in court for the second time on February 13 but the trial was once again adjourned. Meanwhile, 13 supporters who demonstrated silently outside the court building were arrested. Some press reports in Paris said they were released a week later but Moroccan sources in the French capital denied these reports.

PORAT COURTS NRP, LOSES SUPPORT

Tel Aviv NEWSVIEW in English No 12, 20 Mar 84 p 11

[Article by Ya'acov Bar-Natan: "Religious Hawks and Doves"]

[Text]

Why do the super-hawks who broke away from the National Religious Party want to reunite with the party's super-doves? This is the riddle posed by Knesset Members Hanan Porat and Rabbi Haim Druckman who, according to reports leaked last week, have been negotiating with NRP chairman Yosef Burg and party strongman Rafael Ben-Natan behind the backs of the NRP's young-guard leaders Zevulun Hammer and Yehuda Ben-Meir.

The reports caused anger and dismay in Porat's ultra-right-wing Techiya Party, forcing him to resign from the Knesset. Although the party has many religious supporters, it seems that Porat never felt at home in Techiya because it is not specifically religious. With Techiya's political platform — advocating settlement throughout Judea, Samaria and the Gaza Strip and opposing any territorial concession — he has no quarrel. But Porat, seeking a broad, united religious movement, is concerned over the present state of the once-strong National Religious Party, which has shrunk to a mere five seats in the Knesset.

Porat quit the NRP in 1978, when it agreed to back the Camp David accords. More recently, Druckman left to set up his own right-wing Matzad Party, a religious Zionist movement. In Porat's eyes, the veteran leadership of Burg and Ben-Natan is tainted with dovish political views along with a reputation for being more concerned with intrigue than national religious ideals.

So what are the two sides negotiat-

ing about? Porat's and Druckman's answers are naive in the extreme. They insist they are not returning to the NRP; they are proposing, instead, establishment of a completely new party, with a new headquarters and a new name, *Orot* (lights). They claim that Burg agreed not to head the party list in the next election. The first four slots would go to Porat, Druckman and two of their supporters. Burg's *Lamifneh* faction would receive fifth place; Hammer, the seventh, if at all. The party platform would be explicitly hawkish, opposing any territorial concessions in future peace negotiations and calling for massive settlement in and annexation of the territories. Porat says the agreement has already been drawn up, though not signed.

For their part, Burg and Ben-Natan deny all of this. Although he is over 70 and admits to the need for new blood, Burg says he never promised to step down. He is prepared to accept a system in which party members who served two or more Knesset terms would require a larger party central-committee majority than those who never served to get back onto the party list. But, says Burg, suggestions that he approved giving the first four places to the hawks are nonsense. He also denies having agreed to the platform proposed by Porat and Druckman: Burg favors a pluralist party. While fully supporting settlements, he nonetheless describes himself as a centrist. But Burg's aide, Knesset Member Avraham Melamed, along with Ben-Natan and his followers, are outspoken doves. They have no intention of hand-

ing over the party to the religious right wing or changing its name, which they regard as an electoral asset.

It is hard to believe that the two sides are talking about the same negotiations. Either, to put it mildly, someone is not telling the truth or there has been some terrible misunderstanding. Also, it is something of a paradox that Porat and Druckman started negotiating with Burg and Ben-Natan instead of young-guard leaders Hammer and Ben-Meir. After all, the latter two helped initiate the Gush Emunim settlement movement. Yet, in Porat's view, Hammer and Ben-Meir betrayed the cause when they supported Camp David. From Burg and Melamed Porat expected nothing less. This is why Hammer and Ben-Meir were left out in the cold — until news of the negotiations leaked out. Now they too are holding talks with Porat and Druckman, though Hammer, of course, will not agree to dropping down to seventh place on the party list.

Meanwhile, Burg is not giving the negotiations much chance of success and — seasoned negotiator that he is — he is probably right. After all, the gap between the two sides was there from the outset. So why did Burg and Ben-Natan embark on the talks? For starters, it is generally agreed that the NRP's electoral prospects have never been worse; the religious camp, never more divided. Burg cites the Sabbath opening of cinemas and other places of entertainment in Petach Tikvah as a sign that the religious camp is losing ground to the secular or, as he puts it, anti-religi-

ous elements in the secular camp. Therefore, he and Ben-Natan felt it necessary to approach every element formerly associated with the NRP, including Tami, whose party leader Aharon Abuhatzera reportedly said he would never return to an NRP headed by Burg. (After all, Abuhatzera accuses Burg of responsibility for his prosecution — and conviction — on corruption charges.)

Some observers say Burg feared new defections from the NRP's young guard. Its leaders, Hammer and Ben-Meir, have been threatening recently to pull out with their followers. Others say Burg wanted to forestall a young-guard move to take over the party leadership, although this seems less likely. However it is clear that veterans Burg and Ben-Natan have stolen the young guard's thunder. Burg maintains the negotiations were set back by the press leak, which, his aides hint, was the work of Porat's disgruntled secular colleagues in Techiya.

No matter what happens, Porat is clearly the victim. His Gush Emunim supporters deserted him, demanding his resignation from both Techiya and the Knesset. They refused to follow him back to the main religious camp. But if Porat had been as cynical or self-interested as other Knesset members who crossed party lines, he might have refused to resign. Some say he is a political innocent, no match for the wily Burg. The NRP leader reportedly told Porat: "I am giving you the keys to the NRP." "Yes", say the Knesset wags, "but first he changed all the locks."

GALILEE ARABS REVIEWED AS LOYAL TO ISRAEL

Jerusalem THE JERUSALEM POST in English 30 Mar 84 p 3

[Article by Ya'acov Friedler]

[Text]

HAIFA. — Two researchers yesterday challenged the popular conception, on which they said government policies are based, that Galilee Arabs are a "homogenous hostile bloc" that must be contained.

They warned that such an attitude, feeding on itself, would merely aggravate a situation that is still well in hand.

Dr. Sammy Smootha, chairman of Haifa University's sociology department, and Prof. Avraham Wachman, dean of the Technion's Architecture Faculty, cited studies which showed that Galilee Arabs are more loyal to Israel than Israeli Arabs as a whole, and that there is

no danger of Galilee being separated from Israel.

They spoke at a symposium on Jews and Arabs in Galilee held at Haifa University under the auspices of the Institute for Education for Co-Existence between Jews and Arabs, to mark Land Day, which falls today.

Smootha noted that Galilee Jews "hold positions more inimical to peaceful coexistence than the general Jewish population. Only 50 per cent of them wholeheartedly support full rights for the Arab minority, compared to 56 per cent of the general population and 60 per cent of Tel Aviv residents.

Among Jews in Galilee, 72 per cent support restrictions on Arabs to prevent their becoming a majority, and 57 per cent want the government to encourage Arabs to leave the country. As many as 78 per cent think that control over Arabs should be tightened, while 82 per cent believe that most Israeli Arabs cannot be trusted, compared to 57 per cent who hold this opinion countrywide.

On the other hand 67 per cent of Galilee Moslems, Christian, Druse and Beduin see Israeli Arabs as having reconciled themselves to the existence of Israel, while 59 per cent accept that Galilee and the Triangle will remain part of Israel even if a Palestinian state is established in the West Bank and Gaza Strip. Some 31 per cent of those questioned opted for self-administration for these areas.

Only 9 per cent supported "autonomous" legal status for Israeli Arabs, and no more than 13 per cent wanted a hypothetical

Palestinian state to include Galilee and the Triangle.

While the study found that some Israeli Arabs do not accept minority status in Israel, "the majority consider themselves an integral part of Israel and seek solutions to their problems in it," Smootha said.

Wachman, who headed a team which prepared a long development plan for Galilee on behalf of the Jewish Agency's Settlement Department, said he has concluded "there can be no future for Galilee without a rational policy for Israeli Arabs."

"The trouble continues to be that government keeps evading the problem instead of dealing with it seriously," he said, adding that Galilee with its yet unsettled areas presents "the opportunity for planning co-existence." But it is not being exploited, he said, "because policy planners" still see Israeli-Arabs as hostile, and bound to remain so, whereas we should be aiming to reduce hostility until it will eventually be eliminated through comprehensive planning for both Arabs and Jews."

He dismissed as "stupid and meaningless" the slogans of "Judaizing Galilee" and "demographic balance." "If we accept Galilee Arabs as Israelis, there is no need for 'balance' and if we don't, we shall need other means," he said.

He proposed a massive Jewish settlement effort in empty eastern Galilee, including Golan, but none in the Arab-populated western and central sectors. This would give co-existence a chance, by including the Arabs in all development plans and placing them in decision-making government positions where they would be active partners in the process.

Government statistician Prof. Moshe Sikron said the 1983 census showed Galilee with a population of 660,000, about half of them Arabs. The Arab population is growing more rapidly, is younger, more of them than before must travel outside Galilee to work and they are less educated, though their educational standards are markedly rising.

Galilee Arabs have been subject to discrimination, not receiving the development funds directed to Jews. Though most expropriated land is rocky, "the plots are fit for building, as the Jewish lookout settlements have proved, and for quarrying."

Today most Arab villages still lack planning schemes to enable development, and most workers have to travel to "do unskilled work" in the Jewish sector. The Arab farming population has sharply declined to 7.7 per cent, as against 17 per cent in Jewish Galilee.

CSO: 4400/225

BANK OF ISRAEL REPORTS DOLLAR RESERVES DOWN

Jerusalem THE JERUSALEM POST in English 3 Apr 84 p 2

[Article by Avi Temkin]

[Text]

The country's foreign currency reserves dropped by \$75 million during March, the Bank of Israel announced yesterday. The bank added that IS35.5 billion were printed in March to finance government activities.

The bank said that during the 1983/84 fiscal year, the Finance Ministry printed IS220b. IS121 billion were used to finance government operations while the rest was used to support the prices of bank shares and government bonds.

Commenting on these figures, the Finance Ministry said that government expenditures during the last

fiscal year were down 6 per cent in real terms as compared with 1982/83. The ministry added that during the last three months the government's spending level was 4 per cent lower than the monthly average for the previous nine months.

According to the ministry, government expenditure in March was 25 per cent lower than in March 1983.

But privately, ministry officials conceded that the huge monetary injections caused deep concern. According to economic observers in Jerusalem the large amount of money pumped in last month was made necessary by a continuing

drop in tax revenue, which has slumped since October.

Reacting to the drop in foreign-currency reserves, ministry officials said that it was caused by a payment of foreign debts due last month, mainly of loans taken to pay for the Yom Kippur War.

The drop in reserves brought their level to \$2,995 million. It was the first time in several months that reserves fell below the \$3b. mark.

According to Bank of Israel officials, the drop in foreign-currency reserves was caused not only by repayment of debts, but also reflected growing deficits in the balance of payments and renewed demand for imports.

CSO: 4400/225

GOVERNMENT SCHOOL TEACHERS SEEK TO FORM UNION

Jerusalem AL-FAJR in Arabic 21 Mar 84 p 4

[Article: "In Statement by General Committee of Government School Teachers: Determination to Form Union That Adopts Their Just Demands and Defends Their Interests"]

[Text] West Bank--The General Committee of the West Bank Government School Teachers has issued a statement on the professional and material conditions of these teachers. The statement opens by noting the obstruction of the process of improving the West Bank standard of education that these harsh conditions will cause if they continue to deteriorate and if no fundamental solutions are found for them.

Regarding the teachers' professional conditions, the statement notes that the teachers are still without a union that tends their interests and defends their rights. Even though they have tried on several occasions to demand the establishment of such a union, their endeavors have been so far rejected and disregarded by the Israeli authorities, represented by the Israeli education officer.

The statement reviews in detail all the attempts made by the teachers in this regard since 1972. It concludes its discussion of the professional conditions prevalent among the teachers by citing a number of measures taken by the authorities against the teachers--measures that have most often violated acknowledged local and international laws.

The measures taken by the authorities include freezing the grades of numerous teachers without any educational reasons and despite good job performance and the transfer of many teachers from their work centers to other remote centers without any administrative reasons calling for such transfers which harm the educational process itself.

Regarding the teachers' living conditions, the statement notes that the salaries earned by the teachers amounted to an average of 36,000 shekels [monthly] by the end of February 1984. In terms of purchasing power, this average is 30 percent less than the salaries which the teachers earned at the beginning of 1983. These salaries are not enough to secure one third the essential requirements of life.

Concluding its statement, the General Committee of Government School Teachers asserted--because it considers itself the true representative of the government school teachers sector in the West Bank and because it was elected legitimately and democratically--that it still insists on its just demands of achieving a standard of living befitting the teacher's status in society. The committee also reasserted its demand for establishing a teachers union that adopts the teachers' demands and defends their interests.

8494

CSO: 4404/427

WEST BANK ISLAMIC EDUCATION DISCUSSED

Jerusalem AL-FAJR in Arabic 29 Mar 84 p 4

[Interview With 'Abd-al-Razzaq Zallum, Head of Education and Call Section of Islamic Awqaf Department, by Basman Abu Rumaylah: "What Is Required Is Recognition of Religious Certificate in West Bank, Same as Industrial, Hotel, Trade, Postal and Nursing Education"]

[Text] Because the school is the social establishment that provides students with valuable information, trains them in good and noble habits, enables them to gain good skills and implants in them the right tendencies which they need in their daily life and their future, I have interviewed educator 'Abd-al-Razzaq Zallum, the head of the education and call section of the Islamic Awqaf [Religious Trusts] Department, at his office in the department so that he may shed light on religious [shar'i] education in the West Bank.

Answering a question on the number of Islamic religious schools in the West Bank, Zallum said that there are seven schools, five for males and two for females, distributed as follows:

Two in Jerusalem, one for males and one for females, located in the blessed al-Aqsa Mosque; two in Hebron, one for males and one for females, and one school for males in each of al-Birah, Nabulus and Janin. There are 1,473 male and female students in these schools.

There are religious schools established by the Awqaf which spends on these schools and supplies them with all the employees, implements, stationary and books they need. The education section supervises these schools directly. The schools are:

Al-Aqsa Religious Secondary School for Boys, founded in 1958.

The Religious Secondary School for Girls, founded in 1970.

Al-Birah Religious Secondary School, founded in 1980.

As for the other schools, they have been founded by charitable associations and are under the academic and educational supervision of the Islamic Awqaf Department. The Ministry of Islamic Affairs, Holy Places and Religious

Trusts supplies a number of its university employees to work in these schools. It also supplies them with books and notebooks. The education section supervises the application of the curricula, provides technical guidance and conducts the examinations.

Regarding the objective behind founding these schools, educator Zallum has asserted that the Ministry of Awqaf undoubtedly has several noble objectives. Religious education is one of these objectives because it represents the ministry's religious message by spreading religious awareness and graduating Muslim youth who learn the principles of religion and teach them to others. Religious education is one of the most important tributaries supplying the higher institutes and universities with vigilant youth.

As to whether the religious school certificate has been acknowledged or not, Zallum has said that more than 20 years have passed since the graduation of the first batch of youth from the West Bank religious schools. Regrettably, the religious school certificate has not been recognized yet, despite the efforts made. The certificate is not recognized by the institutions that have founded these schools, keeping in mind that the Saudi universities recognized the certificate in 1962, the Syrian, Iraqi and Egyptian universities in 1963, the Libyan and Sudanese universities in 1964, the University of Qatar in 1967 and the Zitouna University in Tunisia in 1967. So far, our universities have not recognized the religious certificate of the schools we have founded.

The conditions under which the students of religious schools live are difficult conditions, considering that these students are required to prepare for two examinations, namely the examinations for the religious certificate and the general high school certificate. This duality has a negative impact on the results scored by the students, causing them to fail to score high marks in either this or that examination. Moreover, a large number of students are forced to withdraw from religious school shortly before examination time in order to devote full time to the general high school examination, with the student thus wasting the efforts of 3 years and with the Ministry of Religious Trusts shouldering costs for a certificate that ultimately is not recognized. We should keep in mind that other educational courses have been considered as equal to the general high school certificate, such as postal education, nursing and hotel education. So why isn't religious education recognized thus far?

Answering a question on the efforts exerted to have the certificate recognized, the head of the education and call section said that extensive efforts have been exerted with the ministries of religious trusts and education, adding: I have personally gone to Amman several times and I have been asked to supply them with the curricula and with some information. This has been done and I believe that ceaseless efforts are being now exerted toward this objective.

Answering a question on whether there is a plan to try again insofar as recognition of the religious school certificate is concerned, Zallum expressed the belief that the circumstances are now conducive to exerting efforts so that the students may be reassured regarding their future.

Regarding the religious curriculum of the religious schools, Zallum pointed out that the curriculum is complete and comprehensive and includes 14 religious subjects, such as jurisprudence, the principles of jurisprudence, the Hadith, religious interpretation, the prophet's life and history. The students of religious schools also study the curricula of the government schools--the literary [liberal arts] branch--in addition to the religious curriculum and the science branch. This enables the religious school student to be familiar with secular and religious disciplines. A poet has said:

How beautiful are religion and the secular when combined;
And how ugly man's atheism and bankruptcy.

Zallum added: The method adopted in the religious certificate examination is the same method adopted in the general high school certificate examination insofar as formulating the questions, forming the control committees, checking the scores and announcing the results are concerned.

Moreover, religious education is spread and recognized throughout the Arab and Islamic worlds. This type of education is old and deep-rooted. So why isn't religious education recognized in our West Bank? Aren't our students suffering from enough catastrophes and tribulation?

What is required is that the religious certificate be recognized in order that the religious schools may be able to perform their message in the best manner possible in serving the students.

8494

CSO: 4404/427

BRIEFS

WEST BANK APPOINTMENTS--AL-FAJR has learned that Fayiz al-Hazinah yesterday assumed his duties as the new general director of religious trusts in the West Bank and as director of the Jerusalem religious trusts. It has also been learned that it was decided on the 17th of this month to appoint Hasan Tahbub, the former general director of religious trusts, as adviser to the minister of religious trusts, Islamic affairs and holy places for West Bank affairs. [Text] [Jerusalem AL-FAJR in Arabic 21 Mar 84 p 1] 8494

HEBRON ECONOMIC SITUATION--The economic situation in the city of Hebron continues to deteriorate and it is noticed that the various [economic] activity sectors have been affected by the poor economic situation. Numerous citizens have stopped completing the construction of their houses. Families with limited income are suffering from hard living conditions because of the unavailability of steady work for family supporters. The owners of shoe and novelty shops say that they open their shops from the morning till the evening without selling anything. Taxicabs are seen idle. [Text] [Jerusalem AL-FAJR in Arabic 24 Mar 84 p 4]

GAZA TRAVEL BAN--The commander of the Israeli army in the Gaza Strip has issued a directive prohibiting Strip inhabitants from leaving the Strip and entering the West Bank areas, the Jerusalem Municipality jurisdiction and the jurisdictions of the local councils of 'Arraba el-Taiyiba and Rahit. This directive is effective from 30 to 31 March 1984. [Text] [Jerusalem AL-SHA'B in Arabic 28 Mar 84 p 1] 8494

MUSLIM HOSPICE IN HEBRON--The Hebron Religious Trusts Department has completed construction of the new headquarters of the hospice of our master Ibrahim [Abraham], may peace and prayers be upon him, whose construction has taken nearly 8 months. The hospice is located near the venerable al-Ibrahimi Mosque and its costs have amounted to nearly 30,000 Jordanian dinars. It is worth noting that Our Master Ibrahim's Hospice has been in existence for hundreds of years and that employees of the Islamic Religious Trusts Department prepare here daily soup meals to distribute to the poor and the destitute in the city of Hebron. [Text] [Jerusalem AL-SHA'B in Arabic 1 Apr 84 p 3] 8494

CHANGE OF INSTITUTION NAME--The minister of religious trusts has agreed to change the name of the Jerusalem Shari'a Institute to the Jerusalem Islamic Sciences College as of 28 March 1984. [Text] [Jerusalem AL-FAJR in Arabic 29 Mar 84 p 4] 8494

CSO: 4404/427

OCCUPIED TERRITORIES MINISTER ON PALESTINIAN, SYRIAN RELATIONS

London AL-TADAMUN in Arabic No 52, 7 Apr 84 pp 25-26

[Interview with Shawkat Mahmud, minister for occupied territories, by Najih Khalil: "Amman Is Not Looking for the Palestinian Card, Its Concern Is To Rescue the West Bank"; date and place not specified]

[Text] Some time ago, the lights began to focus on Palestinian-Jordanian relations, especially after Yasir 'Arafat's visit to 'Amman and the coordination between the two sides, as well as the agreement on joint activity on the level of mobilizing the issue through a joint delegation, which will undertake an Arab and European tour. In this context, interest has been focused on the role of the masses and leaders of the occupied territories on the level of self-determination and the expression of their opinion on current developments that bear on their future. Mr Shawkat Mahmud is the minister for occupied territories affairs in the Jordanian government. He is also a member of the joint Palestinian-Jordanian committee that is concerned with steadfastness in the occupied territories and relations between Jordan and the PLO. In this interview, he casts light on Jordanian-Palestinian relations and the situation in the occupied territories.

Jordan and Palestine

[Question] By now, more than one Palestinian official has visited 'Amman and met with Senior Jordanian officials. Statements from both the Palestinian and the Jordanian side have affirmed the essential nature of coordination between the two parties. After all this, many are still saying that the relationship between the two sides has not entered a serious framework. They say that both sides fear the future results of this relationship. Can you clarify the picture for us with regard to this matter?

[Answer] You say that the people and the press look at this relationship in that way, but in my estimation the Jordanian-Palestinian relationship is solid and good, because the goal of both sides rests on a common foundation: to rescue the people from the occupation. There is no doubt that the relationship will continue to rest on a solid basis. The visits undertaken by our brother officials in the PLO are nothing new. They might be intensive at this time, but they are on-going and present. Indeed, some officials on the executive committee reside in 'Amman.

[Question] There is an analysis that says that relations between Jordan and Syria have become more tense following Jordan's rapprochement with the PLO, both before the events in Tripoli and after.

[Answer] As I told you with regard to the Palestinian-Jordanian relationship, it is an on-going thing. Jordan's rapprochement policy toward the PLO were based on its demand that the legitimacy of the PLO and the independent character of Palestinian decision-making be preserved. These words have undergone no change. Jordan still demands that everyone preserve the legitimacy of the PLO and the independence of its decision-making. This is a continuing Jordanian policy that was announced long ago. There is nothing new about it.

[Question] Some western analyses say that there is a hidden Jordanian-Syrian struggle over who will take the Palestinian card.

[Answer] It is not necessary for analysis to be precise to this degree. As for the Jordanian side, I say we are not looking for the Palestinian card. We do not want to own it. Our policy is clear. It is based on the notion that the PLO is the legitimate representative of the Palestinian people. We are always trying to help the PLO, by preserving it. We support the continuity of independent Palestinian decision-making, which must be free in all areas. I want to affirm here once again that Jordan has not for a single moment thought of being an alternative to the PLO. Even if we were to return to the past and look at all the things that have happened, we would see that Jordan has never thought about being an alternative to the PLO. Jordan still says that the PLO is the sole and legitimate representative of the PLO.

Negotiating With Israel

[Question] Will Jordanian-Palestinian relations lead to joint negotiations with Israel about the West Bank? Given the fact that Israel has already seized half of the territory and established settlements on it, what will there be to negotiate about?

[Answer] It is not necessary for the relationship to be the start of negotiations. Who said that any relationship between Jordan and the PLO would be the start of negotiations with Israel? The Jordanian-Palestinian relationship and the continuation of coordination in this regard are matters of importance to the people on the West Bank. They help them be steadfast and raise their spirits. Therefore, they must continue. With regard to Israel's expropriation of the territory, it has taken about 47 percent of the land of the West Bank so far. As for the foundation of the peace we are striving for, it was set forth in the Arab peace initiative that was approved at the Fes summit.

[Question] Do you think that a new Israeli government from the Alignment grouping could be desirous of peace?

[Answer] It does not matter whether Israel is led by the Likud or the Alignment, as there is no difference between the two on the basic questions.

Rather, the two of them differ only with regard to style. They do not disagree on the subject of settlement. They disagree on the location of the first and second settlement. So far, they have not reached the stage of which you spoke. Instead, they still feel superior, despite the existence of movements that warn about the dangers of the future, such as the "Peace Now" movement, etc.

[Question] It is being repeatedly said that there is a crisis with the palestinian refugee relief agency. What point has this crisis reached?

[Answer] When the agency announced the distribution of Palestinian refugee identity cards, delegations came to us from the Palestinian refugees and asked us not to agree to the distribution of these cards. These delegations convinced us of their point of view, according to which these cards will provide the Palestinians with nothing and give them no benefit.

The problem can be summed up by saying that the organization divided the cards into two groups. The letter R was stamped on the first group. A person holding such a card benefits from the services of the organization. The other group was stamped with the letter N. Whoever holds such a card does not benefit from the services of the organization. In light of this division, the number of refugees benefitting from the support of the organization fell from 850,000 to 40,000. There is now a distinction between those who take and those who do not. As the ministry for the affairs of the occupied territories, we have studied this subject with those concerned. We truly found that the refugees will not benefit from the distribution of these new identity cards. Moreover, the mere preparation of the cards cost the organization about \$2 million. This has made us ask why the organization would spend effort and money to distribute cards the refugees do not want. It would have been better if the organization had used this sum to open two schools. On this basis, and after discussing the matter, we demanded that the organization not distribute the new cards.

The Palestinians of the Diaspora

[Question] As part of any resolution of the Palestinian problem, is Jordan ready to host the Palestinians of the Diaspora?

[Answer] You are speaking about the future. None of us knows a thing about it. This means that the answer depends on the future and the possibilities of resolution. In fact, the Arab circumstances we are experiencing cause the pessimists to proliferate and the optimists to be in the minority. I ask God to guide the Arab nation, so that its circumstances will improve and the process will be reversed. Then there will be many optimists and few pessimists. The achievement of true Arab solidarity is especially important. The inter-Arab conflicts from which we suffer today do not forebode good. The danger is that they will continue, but we pray God that they will end, that the Arabs may turn toward what is in their interest.

BRIEFS

CHINESE ARMS--In confirmation of information published by AL-TADAMUN two issues ago concerning the readiness of the People's Republic of China to supply Jordan's needs for light and medium weapons with which to arm the Jordanian Popular Army, AL-TADAMUN has learned that a military delegation including the commander of the Jordanian Popular Army left the Jordanian capital for Peking 2 days after the departure of the Chinese president. The delegations will meet and hold talks with officials there on the subject of China's aforementioned readiness. AL-TADAMUN has also learned that more than one Jordanian military delegation has departed from 'Amman for various countries in order to study their experiences in the field of building popular armies. [Text] [London AL-TADAMUN in Arabic No 52, 7 Apr 84 p 6] 12224

CSO: 4404/428

KUWAIT PETROLEUM CORPORATION'S PROFITS INCREASE

Kuwait ARAB TIMES in English 12-13 Apr 84 p 15

[Text]

KUWAIT Petroleum Corporation defied the global recession and the sluggish state of international oil market to boost 1982-83 profits to 307.4 million dinars (1,046 million dollars), 2.8 percent more than the previous year, it was revealed in Kuwait yesterday.

Although crude oil and liquefied gas exports were sharply down over the period, oil production, refinery output, gas liquefaction and petroleum products all increased, according to KPC's annual report unveiled at a press conference by the deputy board chairman Abdul Razzaq Mulla Hussein.

Outlining the state hydrocarbons concern's achievements over the period, Hussein pointed out to the adverse conditions affecting KPC over the financial year, listed by the KPC Chairman and Finance and Oil Minister Sheikh Ali Al Khalifa in the report as continuing world economic recession, slack demand for oil and the tendency for consumers to use stockpiled reserves.

Credit for overcoming these disadvantages lay with the corporation's overall strategy of diversification and integration, Sheikh Ali said, in which notable progress was made last year with the acquisition of more European outlets and marketing facilities.

Profit

KPC aimed not only to maintain and increase its profit margins but to continue to expand its scope of activities into exploration

and downstream operations, further consolidating its competitive international role, the minister said in the report.

Of particular consequence in this respect, he pointed out, was the purchase last year of Gulf Oil facilities in five European countries, including 1,575 filling stations, two refineries, two lubrication oil plants and a variety of storage facilities.

Role

By consolidating its international role and entering directly into operations at Rotterdam oil terminal, Northern Europe's main distribution point, the Corporation was making firm strides towards establishing its presence abroad and safeguarding its vital interests, he said.

Detailing figures for 1982-83 Hussein said that crude oil production rose slightly by 2.5 million barrels to reach 262.6 million barrels, averaging 719,300 bpd.

These figures he pointed out, excluded the joint Kuwaiti-Saudi Wafra oilfield, where Kuwait's share of production fell from 26 million to 22.4 million barrels.

Natural gas production, on the other hand, dropped 2.3 percent to total 153.7 billion cubic feet, a daily average of 421 million cubic feet.

But the amount of oil processed in KPC's three local refineries — Mina Al Ahmadi, Mina Abdullah and Shuaiba — shot up to an average of 479,000 bpd, compared to 314,000 bpd the

previous year, reaching a total of some 175 million barrels.

Petroleum products also rocketed from 15.5 to 23.5 million metric tons, according to the report.

Hussein said while gas liquefaction rose slightly over the period from 1.3 to 1.4 million tons, adverse market conditions meant that existing facilities continued to be underutilized in Kuwait.

While liquefied gas exports mainly to the Far Eastern markets, dropped from 1.7 million tons last year to 1.05 million in the period covered by the report, this was compensated for by four consecutive price rises which boosted the price of exported propane from 228 to 283 dollars per ton, the KPC deputy board chairman said.

Activities

Crude oil exports also reflected the state of world demand in 1982-83, reaching only 62.2 percent of the volume recorded in the previous financial year. 98.8 million barrels of

crude (271,000 bpd) were exported by KPC, the report said, a stark contrast over the preceding year.

KPC's wholly-owned subsidiary Kuwait External Oil Exploration Company, meanwhile, expanded its operations from activities in well-established oil-producing areas to new potential sites.

Negotiations currently underway between the company and the governments of Bahrain, Pakistan and Tunisia for exploration concessions are expected to culminate in the signing of agreements in the near future, a significant achievement for KPC which is a relative newcomer to the exploration field, the report said.

The company, in conjunction with Gulf oil, has also submitted a feasibility and development report on new finds to the Indonesian government which is likely to lead to an increase in activities there.

External drilling and exploration activities were also underway in Egypt, Oman and Australia, with the company winning concessions in Congo, Sudan, Tanzania, Turkey and China.

CSO: 4400/224

POSITION, DEMANDS OF LEBANESE FORCES OUTLINED

London AL-TADAMUN in Arabic No 49, 17 Mar 84 pp 17-18

[Article: "The Lebanese Forces Are Afraid for the Christian Presence; Alliance with Israel Has Not Been Ruled Out"]

[Text] Following the Damascus summit between President Amin al-Jumayyil and President Hafiz al-Asad and the cancellation of the 17 May accord, the Lebanese Forces believe that Lebanon has entered the Syrian era. They support statements attributed to former American Secretary of State Dr Henry Kissinger, who said in a press conference held in Houston on 3 March, "A probable agreement between Lebanon and Syria would be considered a victory, not a reconciliation. There will be a government loyal to Syria in Lebanon, and Syria will have the right to veto any decision taken by this government. You can call that a reconciliation, but it should really be considered a victory for extremist factions."

A source within the Lebanese Forces said that the cancellation of the 17 May accord would not assure the departure of the non-Lebanese forces present on the country's soil, because Israel insists on executing all the arrangements set forth in the accord with Lebanon. Moreover, active and responsible voices have begun to be raised in the Hebrew state, calling out that there is no need to hurry up the withdrawal from the south. In the forefront of these voices is that of the Israeli chief of staff, General Moshe Levi. These voices reflect a change in the tone used by the senior officers of the Israeli defense army.

Persons close to the leadership of the Lebanese Forces think that the cancellation of the agreement signed by Lebanon and Israel exposes the country to the danger of partition, because the Syrians will give the government in Lebanon nothing but a cease-fire and political and security conditions that will provide tranquility and security for the capital of Beirut and its suburbs. In addition, there might be partial withdrawals that in the best of cases would fall short of what both the government and the Lebanese aspire to.

These persons add that Syria considers its security to be part and parcel of that of Lebanon. It believes that the Biqa, especially in its western section, forms the exposed flank of Damascus in the direction of Israel. Consequently, this flank must be fortified by an effective Syrian military presence forming a secure rear and protective umbrella. The first line of confrontation would be on Lebanese soil, instead of on the Syrian-Israeli borders.

Thus--according to a source in the Lebanese Forces--it is impossible for Syria to give Lebanon much and permit it to extend its legitimate authority, even gradually, without making a group of political, military, and economic demands. Here are the most prominent ones:

1. In its Arab policy, Lebanon should belong to the Syrian axis. That is, the regional policy of the two countries ought to be the same.
2. A Syrian military commission would be formed and given the task of coordinating policy with the command and the intelligence directorate of the Lebanese army. This coordination would take place in the areas of planning, operations, and the exchange of information, especially since Damascus--despite the activity of its intelligence service in Lebanon--needs data and information that can only be provided by the intelligence directorate.
3. Agreements concerning economic integration between Lebanon and Syria would be signed.

The source added that Damascus would put forth a request whose realization may not be supported by the international situation: the removal of differences between the Syrian and Lebanese regimes.

Sources within the Lebanese monastic orders think that Syria has placed major significance on the cancellation of the 17 May accord for internal reasons, given the many difficulties the regime faces internally. Damascus wishes to affirm to Syrian public opinion that it will continue to follow its political line for Arab reasons, in order to strengthen the forces opposed to the continuation of the Camp David path in Egypt. In addition, it wishes to bypass the attempts made to resurrect the Jordanian option via the recent rapprochement between King Husayn and Mr Yasir 'Arafat and to respond to what recently occurred at the fourth Islamic Summit Conference. The summit returned 'Arafat to the limelight less than a month after he left Tripoli in defeat in the face of the Syrian forces and it admitted Egypt to the Islamic Conference Organization through a wide-open gate.

Moreover, some international factors were behind the cancellation. Among them was the realization by the United States of America that it could not solve the Middle East Crisis alone and [not] give the Soviet Union a political foothold in every solution cooked up for the crisis.

However, the question posed by these sources was this: What will Lebanon gain in return for this valuable present of the cancellation, which it is giving to Syria?

Are the cease-fire, the resumption of the dialogue, and the formation of a national unity government just recompense? Will this be enough to let Lebanon ignore the Israeli presence in the south and go past the American annoyance expressed by Secretary of State George Schultz in an interview published by the magazine US NEWS AND WORLD REPORT? He said, "Those who demand the cancellation of the Lebanese-Israeli agreement must bear the responsibility of finding another formula that will lead to the withdrawal of the foreign forces from Lebanon."

The Lebanese Forces feel that they must preserve the "free" and unique Christian presence within the framework of a formula that will assure the emergence of a pluralistic society that will provide the rights of all the sects, while achieving their aspirations, which aim at the affirmation of their identities. The Lebanese Forces do not object to this formula being a kind of federalism. The organization thinks that "The 17 May accord was cancelled, but no guarantees were obtained that would dispel the danger threatening the Christians, who have been given no assurances that they can return to their property and their villages in the mountain and the Biqa', and even the western area of Beirut, after people have been slaughtered and driven away. This is an extremely serious act. It places in jeopardy the fate of the Christians in the south, who have been forced to request protection from Israel and announce their opposition to the cancellation of the 17 May agreement in the Jazzin festival."

An official in the Lebanese Forces said, "We do not doubt the Lebanese or Christian character of President al-Jumayyil, but we will not rest until we are certain that the Christians will not face a fate like that of their brothers in the Shuf and 'Alay, especially since the events witnessed by the Lebanese capital on 6 February had serious sectarian dimensions which will be brought closer to being realized by those who have been planning their commencement once they have the chance.

However, the president of the Phalange, Shaykh Pierre al-Jumayyil, has taken a firm stand at the side of his son, disregarding the dispute underway in the party's political office over the cancellation's good points and bad points. This position has been applied to the leaders of the Lebanese Forces, who are headed by the Phalangist Fadi Afram. It has placed them in a difficult position, especially since the members of the leadership unanimously opposed the cancellation of the 17 May agreement.

The Forces had backed the position of former President Camille Sham'un, who had warned that cancellation of the agreement would be punished by a boycott of the second round of the national dialogue conference and non-participation in any government formed after the conference. However, a change occurred in the position of the president of the Lebanese Front after he visited President al-Jumayyil at B'abda Palace on Sunday, 4 March.

After the meeting, former President Sham'un told his visitors, "It seems that there are positive aspects and guarantees. The president of the republic told me that Syrian President Hafiz al-Asad gave him this answer after he promised him that he would cancel the 17 May agreement: "Mr President, let Your Excellency issue a command and I will implement it." The extremists in the Lebanese Front was preparing a way out, so that he could step back from his firm position.

On the level of the monastic orders, the government has conducted intensive contacts with a number of fathers general. These contacts succeeded in winning over the chairman of the permanent conference of monastic orders, Abbot Bulus Ni'man, since Abbot Ilyas 'Atallah, the general head of the Antonian order and a member of the permanent conference, insisted on adding a clause to the conference's statement, in which he announced his solidarity with the Christians in their fears and aspirations and called on them to support the president of the republic in every step he would take.

This clause was added some hours after the statement was issued. The interesting thing is that the Lebanese newspaper AL-ANWAR published both the morning and the evening versions of the statement. The difference in points of view within the permanent conference of Lebanese monastic orders would have developed, but the Papal ambassador, Monsignor Luciano Angeloni, decided the matter at a meeting between himself and the fathers general of the monastic orders. He convinced them to support the legitimate authorities and back the president of the republic in any decision he might take. The support of Cardinal Mar Antonius Butrus Khuraysh and the Patriarch of the Greek Orthodox, Ignatius the Fourth Hazim, provided backing and support for the position taken by President Amin al-Jumayyil on the Lebanese-Syrian summit meeting.

Since most of the members of the Lebanese Forces are Phalangists (some 60 percent), they could not go any further in their opposition. They are striving for a grass-roots Christian-Israeli alliance that will bypass the political leaders and the complicated circumstances that constrain their options and decisions as they are forced to back the president of the republic. The results on the ground might change their convulsive convictions and orient them toward Syria. The Lebanese Forces have not forgotten the following:

The patriotism of Amin al-Jumayyil is not a matter for doubt. Neither is his Lebanese character. He can do nothing that conflicts with the interest of Lebanon.

The president of the republic has become cautious in his dealing with Israel, which, with its surprising withdrawal from the mountain, caused massacres that took 1850 Lebanese lives, including 1500 Christians, in addition to hundreds of combatants. Moreover, the underpinning of the Lebanese Forces was destroyed.

The choice made by President al-Jumayyil is a result of the fact that Lebanon cannot possibly make a free choice, now that America has disgracefully abandoned the promises that were reaffirmed by the administration of President Reagan more than once. Moreover, there were no clear Israeli commitments to withdraw if the agreement were concluded.

Developments are moving quickly. What might be true today might not be so tomorrow. The Lebanese scene might witness great new events in the not-so-distant future.

Informed sources are afraid of Israel's ability to throw into disarray many matters on the ground and undo any solution that is inconsistent with its political and security interests in Lebanon. Therefore, they have not ruled out an increased role for violence in the country. This could be expressed by various forms of terrorist activity: assassinations, the detonation of car bombs, etc.

Other sources thought that the United States had left Lebanon only to return. If Washington was annoyed by the cancellation of the 17 May agreement, this means it will return via Israel in order to create a new political and security situation that will do away with all the faits accomplis on the ground.

If Washington has consigned Lebanon to Syria, then the choice made by President al-Jumayyil is final, despite all the reservations and the air of annoyance.

At any rate, according to a source in the Lebanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the coming days are pregnant with surprises. Lebanon is facing its destiny alone, except for the conditions imposed upon it, which it accepts in the manner of the saying: "He who compels your brother is not a hero."

12224

CSO: 4404/385

LEBANESE FORCES. ISRAELI INTENTIONS IN SOUTH DISCUSSED

London AL-TADAMUN in Arabic No 49, 17 Mar 84 pp 18-19

[Article: "The Jazzin Festival Raised the Israeli Option, Against the Wish of the Majority of Christians"]

[Text] Will Tel Aviv's response to the cancellation of the Israeli-Lebanese agreement by the president of the Lebanese republic, Amin al-Jumayyil, be to announce "local administration" in occupied southern Lebanon and turn the security of the region over to the elements of the Army of Free Lebanon there?

This question is being asked with urgency today in official, political, and popular circles, especially since in the last 2 weeks Israeli leaders have begun to hint at their determination to redeploy their forces north of the al-Awwali River. They are hinting that they are trying to create special security arrangements, headed by a division of the Christian Lebanese Forces and the Shi'ite National Guard.

The Jazzin festival, which was set up by the Free Christian Grouping, was held while President al-Asad and President al-Jumayyil were holding their summit talks. Its effect was to confirm the fears of all political, religious, and popular circles. The organizers of the festival, which was protected by the forces of the occupation, called for political, military, economic, and cultural cooperation with Israel and the denial of Arabs and Arabism. They demanded that Christian youths enroll in the ranks of the Army of Free Lebanon. As a result of the Jazzin festival, observers concluded that Israel cannot and, in practical terms, does not want to respond to the cancellation of the 17 May agreement, except via the method of inducing fighting among the Lebanese themselves, just as happened in the mountain.

In this regard, observers noted three important points:

First the festival was not separate from a contrived climate, the responsibility for which is to be borne by numerous parties, now and in the recent and distant past. It seems that the people who imposed it still are not able to believe that its decisive result, as has been the case so far, will be nothing else but the performance of a service for Israel and Israel alone.

Second this festival was held at this juncture in order to dispel the ray of hope emitted by President al-Jumayyil's visit to Damascus, which suggested that it was

possible to reach a resolution of the matter of the accord of 17 May and consequently the matter of Lebanese unity within the framework of cooperative coexistence among the Lebanese.

Third the festival was a renewed attempt to save the face of those who have bet and still are betting on Israel, since they think that current international and regional circumstances, although perhaps not favoring them now, might not last long.

In this sense, the Jazzin festival--according to a prominent politician--was a new attempt to undermine the Lausanne conference and cause the failure of the national reconciliation and unification put forward in Geneva. The 17 May accord was a stumbling block in the way of these two goals. Thus, the festival was a new foreign operation coming from outside the country. It was an attempt to exploit Christian fears, with historic roots, for the Christian presence in Lebanon, especially in the aftermath of the events in the mountain and Beirut.

A Pretext for Israel

Islamic leaders and important figures in Sidon and the south saw in the Jazzin festival a pretext for the Israeli occupiers to increase their oppression and transgressions. They thought it would facilitate the placing of the decision-making power and national affiliation of the southern Christians in the pocket of the occupation forces. These leaders and important figures called on the Christians of the region to rise above the provocation of sectarian sensitivities and halt this dangerous progression, which, if allowed to continue, will tear apart the south and eliminate its people.

Moreover, Shaykh Mahdi Shams-al-Din, the deputy chairman of the Higher Shi'ite Islamic Council, and Lawyer Nabih Birri, the president of the Amal Movement, as well as some deputy ministers from the region, criticized the Jazzin festival by saying that it was unjustified and that Israel could not give a guarantee to anyone, as was demonstrated in the mountain war. They said that fear could not be handled by deciding for Israel, but by strengthening the bonds of national unity, which is the only way to remove fear for sure.

However, a division of the Lebanese Forces responded for its part to these calls with increased military concentrations in the region of Jazzin. The organization reopened the five barracks it had closed a month ago and brought 3000 fighters into the region. It brought them in from the areas of Kisrawan, Jubayl, and al-Barbarah, and they are outfitted with 100 tanks, 20 artillery pieces, 120 troop transports, 200 trucks and small jeeps, and 40 rocket launchers, which were transported by sea from the port of Juniyah to the ports of al-Jiyah and Sidon.

It is worth noting that the Lebanese Forces have 2500 fighters outfitted with the most modern heavy, intermediate, and light weapons in the area around Jazzin, the coastal villages of al-Kharub province, and al-Zahrani. These troops have been joined by 700 fighters from the regular forces that withdrew from the region of Western al-Shahhar when it fell. They headed for al-Jiyah with all their personal and heavy weapons. A unit of the American Marines was asked by the Lebanese government to transport some of the regular forces, who wanted to go to their barracks. Using three large military craft, the Marines transported 80 persons and

12 tanks to their headquarters. These refused to fight alongside the Lebanese Forces and asked to leave the region. These forces kept some heavy weapons belonging to regular forces and refused to turn them over to the legitimate authorities.

The Lebanese Forces are facing the Amal Movement and the Nasirist Popular Organization, which is headed by Eng Mustafa Ma'ruf Sa'd, in addition to all the Islamic and patriotic forces in the region, which has a population numbering some 300,000 souls. They are distributed through three districts: Jazzin, Sidon, and al-Zahrani. The Christian population is 90,000, versus 210,000 Muslims.

Disagreements and Worry

Something should be pointed out here that has to do with the state of worry and anxiety that has afflicted the ranks of the Lebanese Forces since the battles in the mountain, the suburb, and West Beirut, after which many young Christian men began to flee from compulsory military service in the ranks of the Lebanese Forces and emigrate from their fatherland. In order to control the unusual situation from which these forces have begun to suffer, the leadership has appointed Dr Samir Ja'ja', well known for his strictness and extremism, as the official in charge of "general mobilization."

Moreover, the signs of disputes within the Lebanese Forces have escaped no one. It has become well known to all that there are two currents in its ranks. The first is the moderate current led by Fadi Afram. It is characterized by loyalty to the president of the Phalange, Shaykh Pierre al-Jumayyil, and consequently it supports President Amin al-Jumayyil. The second current is led by Samir Ja'ja' and Elie Habiqa. It opposes President al-Jumayyil, especially on the issue of the cancellation of the 17 May accord.

The intense struggle currently going on between the two currents is both political and military in character. The most important points of disagreement between them revolve around the continued support by the first current for Lebanese unity. The first current is still concerned about Lebanon's Christians and their interests in the Arab countries, and it leans toward the Arab option, while the second current thinks that the Christians no longer have any other option but to announce their state and to ally finally with Israel. The first public manifestation of the second current came at the Jazzin festival, which was reportedly attended by more than 20,000 persons, though sources in the Amal Movement said that no more than 8000 attended.

No matter how many attended the festival, it is certain that most of them were not inhabitants of the Jazzin region and the south. Indeed, they came from the armed Lebanese Forces that have concentrated in the south from various parts of Lebanon, and from among the refugees from the Shuf, the mountain, and the region of al-Shahhar, who are angry at the loss of their relatives, homes, and livelihoods. The festival aroused a great deal of fear among most Lebanese, who hold to the idea of the unity of their country and its Arab affiliation, because it was the first event of its kind in the modern history of Lebanon. However, the reasons and circumstances that led to it being convened actually were nothing more than a direct, spontaneous reaction to events and occurrences that occurred

in the mountain and western al-Shahhar. These reasons will disappear when those events have done so. The proof of that is the way in which the fundamental Christian leaders, in both the political and the spiritual spheres, have clung to Lebanon's basic unionist orientation, which is supportive of its Arab affiliation. These leaders were absent from the Jazzin festival, and neither the Christian people of the south themselves nor their leaders took part in it.

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LAUSANNE CONFERENCE RESOLVES NOTHING OF IMPORTANCE

London AL-TADAMUN in Arabic No 50, 24 Mar 84 pp 8-12

[Article by Joseph al-Qusayfi: "The Disagreement Among Those Seeking Reconciliation in Lausanne Delays the Decision, But Does Not Dispel the Specter of the Explosion"]

[Text] The second session of the Lebanese national reconciliation conference being held at the Beau Rivage Hotel in Lausanne, which was supposed to end within 48 hours or 3 days at the most, has become lengthy in the midst of a state of affairs resembling a dialogue among deaf men. The dialogue is between the parties invited to the conference. More serious than all that is the fact that this session has witnessed a sectarian screening on the level of the political leaders. This reached its utmost extent last Sunday and Monday, when those in attendance at the conference disagreed about many essential matters, including:

1. The elimination of political sectarianism and the transformation of Lebanon into a single electoral district. This is a demand to which Nabih Birri, the president of the Amal Movement, has clung. He said it was the minimum he could accept in order to be in harmony with the efforts being made to revive the country's normal life.
2. The election of the prime minister from among the Chamber of Deputies.

Former Prime Minister Sa'ib Salam went still further when he demanded that this election be accompanied by several constitutional measures that would allow the prime minister to form his own government and submit a proposal for it to the president of the republic, who would issue it in a decree. In addition, the government would take its oath in front of the Chamber of Deputies and hold its meeting with the prime minister as chairman, without it being necessary for the president of the republic to attend.

During the sessions of the second round of the Lausanne conference, the representatives of the Islamic sects rejected many articles contained in the draft proposal offered by the president of the republic. It contains a summary of the ideas and proposals contained in the constitutional document drawn up in 1976, as well as the ideas contained in the proposals and projects of the conflicting factions on the Lebanese scene.

Amin al-Jumayyil's Draft

The most prominent thing contained by this draft was political centralism designed to assure the unity of the land, people, and institutions of the country, as well as national balance and equality among the spiritual families that make up Lebanon. It also contained broad administrative decentralization, which would allow the people to participate directly in the development of all the regions of the country in a just and integrated fashion within the framework of effective, interacting regional units.

President al-Jumayyil's draft also provided for having the principal sects participate in the government and the administration through the constitutional offices mentioned below:

The presidency of the republic, the speakership of the Chamber of Deputies, the prime ministership, the deputy prime ministership for the affairs of the public administrations, the deputy prime ministership for developmental affairs, the deputy prime ministership for economic affairs, the deputy prime ministership for social affairs, the deputy speakership of the Chamber of Deputies, and the presidency of the constitutional court. In addition, legislative representation would be expanded by an increase in the number of deputies. This would be done in a manner calculated to achieve correctness in representation, as well as justice on the regional and sectarian levels. This would be done on the basis of competition between Christians and Muslims. The term speaker of the Chamber of Deputies would be made 2 years instead of one, and a majority of two-thirds would be adopted in the Chamber of Deputies when issues of fateful importance would be considered and settled. A majority of 55 percent would be used to elect the president of the republic in the sessions following the first, as well as for nominating the prime minister and conducting votes of confidence.

Moreover, the electoral law would be reformed. The framework of the electoral districts would be maintained, while the process and means of voting would be modernized. One of the draft's important points dealt with the prime minister. In the eighth article, it said:

"The prime minister will be named by the Chamber of Deputies. The designated prime minister will consult the parliament concerning the formation of the government. Afterwards, he will draw up a bill with the names of the ministers, with the agreement of the president of the republic. If the designated prime minister can not form a government within a maximum period of 15 days, and if the government resigns, is dismissed, or loses a vote of confidence, or if the term of the prime minister ends, then the Chamber of Deputies will meet in accordance with the law within 7 days in order to name a new prime minister.

If the Chamber of Deputies can not do so, the president of the republic himself will undertake to name the prime minister, to whom he will give the task of forming a government. The prime minister will supervise the activities of the ministers and monitor the good performance of their work. He will supervise

the execution of the decisions of the cabinet. Both the prime minister and the cabinet ministers will take the constitutional oath in front of the president of the republic, it being stipulated that all decrees and laws will be issued cooperatively by the president of the republic and the prime minister. All will bear the signatures of both officials, with the exception of the decree appointing the prime minister, the acceptance of the government's resignation, and its dismissal. In addition, the president of the republic will have the right to dismiss the cabinet in certain cases to be specified later.

The Extremism of Sa'ib Salam

This draft was rejected by Nabih Birri for numerous reasons, one of which was that it did not plainly specify the elimination of political sectarianism. In addition, it established electoral districts on the basis of the provinces, while Birri has called for the elimination of this kind of sectarianism and the transformation of Lebanon into a single electoral district, so that each deputy would really represent all of Lebanon. In this case, the representative character of the Chamber of Deputies would be comprehensive.

As for former Prime Minister Sa'ib Salam, he was the most extreme participant, since he thought that two deputy prime ministerships ought to be established in order to limit the authority of the prime minister's office. He also called for the elimination of the texts concerning the dismissal of the cabinet and emphasized the need for the prime minister to be elected by the Chamber of Deputies.

The Opinion of the Lebanese Front

As for the Lebanese Front, it expressed numerous observations. Among them was its opposition to having the prime minister named by the Chamber of Deputies. In addition, it opposed the elimination of employment by sectarian quotas and called for the continued division of seats among the factions. In addition, it opposed the lack of clarity in the text dealing with "decentralization." It insisted on broad and clear decentralization in the areas of administration, security, education, and finance. It also opposed an article having to do with the creation of a ministerial committee to oversee the army, the internal security forces, and the public security forces, since it would interfere with the authority and military powers of the commander of the army. The front demanded that the Orthodox sect be fourth on the sectarian scale. It also demanded that there should be seven primary sects instead of six, with the Armenians becoming the seventh one.

Franjiyah's Intransigent Positions

The surprise was that former President Sulayman Franjiyah strongly opposed the elimination of political sectarianism, since he considered that the current Lebanese situation would not allow the sectarian state of affairs experienced by the country to be transcended. Consequently, those at the conference had to be careful not to throw the Christians once and for all into the embrace of Israel.

He told that plainly to Nabih Birri when he met him last Sunday at the luncheon table, saying, "The Christians of Zagharta and the north feel no differently at all from their Christian brothers in the other eastern regions in particular and the rest of Lebanon in general. Nevertheless, I agreed to the "Arab character" of Lebanon during the first session of the Geneva conference and opposed the proposal for a federal state submitted by the Lebanese Front. Therefore, you have to keep our situation in mind as much as possible, especially since there is a Christian faction at the conference that would not be able to return to Beirut if it were pressured into giving concessions. If it were to return, it would face an extremist faction that would be difficult to control. The Christians would then fall into Israel's embrace. This would not be in your interest, in Lebanon's interest, or in the Arabs' interest, especially since the 17 May accord has been cancelled. It was the major stumbling block in the face of any meeting or mutual understanding. This is what I fear. You must bear the entire responsibility, nationally and emotionally."

Sectarian Separation and the Failure of Reform

Last Sunday, matters began to move in a sectarian direction. After learning that the Christian community was in a state of excessive excitement, the Lebanese Front, the leaders of the Lebanese Forces, the monks, and the Christian Leagues began to issue statements and declarations in which they warned that they would not make any essential concessions. The tone of rejection for everything proposed with the aim of taking cards away from the Christian faction grew stronger.

At the same time, the Islamic leaders at the conference held a meeting that lasted until the early hours of the morning in order to prepare a joint Islamic working paper.

It became very clear that the Salvation Front was experiencing difficult circumstances, especially after Walid Junblatt, in an interview with a French radio station, attacked the main figures in the Lebanese Front. He said they were snakes and charged them with double-dealing. He did not spare former President Sulayman Franjiyah in the process. He said about him, "It seems that he has not understood that what recently took place in the country was a revolution."

The response of former President Franjiyah was violent. He said in an interview with the Syrian news agency SANA that the Salvation Front unfortunately no longer existed. He accused the other parties in the front of having failed to commit themselves to what was agreed on at the Damascus meeting. He said, "The change in the climate has changed thinking. The good climate in Damascus changed at Lausanne." As for the conference's only session, which was held last Sunday and lasted no more than 30 minutes, he described it as being saturated with sectarian discussion. He said that what happened after the meeting demonstrated a regrettable sectarian situation. He said, "We ignored the internecine fighting and the Israeli presence. We moved to carry out the plan of the infamous Henry Kissinger, which aims to preserve the situation as it is. Most unfortunately, this is my conclusion about what happened yesterday."

Franjiyah's Meeting with the Phalange

The efforts exerted by 'Abd-al-Halim Khaddam in order to bring together the points of view of former President Sulayman Franjiyah and his comrades in the Salvation Front and the Amal Movement did not succeed. Instead, Franjiyah insisted on his position, and although some officials in the Syrian delegation tried to prevent the interview from leaking out and being published, it was disseminated without the former president seeming to oppose that.

The meetings between the members of the delegations from the Lebanese Phalange Party and the National Liberal Party, as well as former President Sulayman Franjiyah's delegation, lasted 24 hours a day. However, no one succeeded in putting together a meeting that would have brought the two pillars of the front together with their former ally. Many people, especially the president of the republic, Shaykh Amin al-Jumayyil, wanted to see a meeting take place between Shaykh Pierre al-Jumayyil and former President Franjiyah.

Walid Junblatt and the Courting of the Lebanese Front

Perhaps the most amazing thing is that Walid Junblatt had no clear position on what happened during the discussions. While he was sending intermittent signals to the Lebanese Front via former President Camille Sham'un concerning his acceptance of the "federal state" formula presented by the Lebanese Front, he was putting forth demands largely similar to those advanced by former Prime Minister Sa'ib Salam and Nabih Birri. When Khalid Junblatt, a member of the Socialist delegation, read through the working paper of the Lebanese Front, he said, "If you would change the name, I would be the first to sign it. Federalism, confederalism, and the canton system frighten people. It is a reasonable formula, and it might be the basis for a solution."

What is the Syrian Position on All That?

In the midst of these contradictions and the serious sectarian separation, which had never assumed such a form before, one question confused observers in the hallways of the conference, "What is the Syrian position on all this?"

Although the Syrian delegation that accompanied Vice President 'Abd-al-Halim Khaddam kept silent all through the bilateral meetings held on the sidelines of the general sessions and gave no indication of Syria's true activity, all the evidence indicated that Damascus was insisting on leaving the conference with something commensurate with the political victory it achieved when President Amin al-Jumayyil chose to annul the 17 May 1983 accord. There were three reasons for this:

1. Syria was not able to maintain the internal situation in a state of crisis while changes in the region were coming quickly.
2. Syria could not afford to fail, since it feared that this would leave the field open for Israel, allowing it to impose whatever it wanted on the Lebanese scene. This could change Syria's political victory into a security setback, and Damascus could find itself in a military confrontation with Tel

Aviv, without having chosen the place and time. Damascus wants no such confrontation at this stage anyway.

3. Although Damascus was eager not to cut its lines to its allies on the ground, it did not want them to continue to stick to demands that might wreck the dialogue and cause the conference to fail.

On the basis of these givens, it seemed that 'Abd-al-Halim Khaddam was waiting for matters between the factions to escalate and for the suggestions and working papers to be burned before intervening and imposing a solution consistent with the policy laid down by Damascus. He bet that all factions wanted to return to Beirut with certain gains in their hands, and that they were prisoners of their popular bases. This made the Syrian position somewhat shaky. At least this was the impression that the Phalangist delegation, which consisted of George Sa'adah, Michel Samahah, and Joseph al-Hashim, came away with after being closeted with Khaddam for nearly 2 hours last Sunday evening.

The Last Minute Formula

While the Syrian delegation was active all of last Monday (19 March 1984) in side-meetings, it suggested in the hallways of the conference that a certain proposal for a resolution of the conflict would conclude the activity of the conference and contain all the suggestions discussed by those in attendance during the continuous working sessions.

The Syrian delegation called everyone to the meeting hall. Joseph Juraysati read a draft formula of nine foolscap pages that had been prepared by President Amin al-Jumayyil and 'Abd-al-Halim Khaddam. Here are its most important points:

1. The identity of Lebanon and its affiliation (affirmed at the first session of the conference at Geneva).
2. The liberation of the south through adoption of the cancellation of the 17 May 1983 accord and the emphasizing of resistance to the Israeli occupation there, as well as through adherence to the Security Council resolutions calling for the assuring of the Israeli withdrawal and the spread of Lebanese sovereignty in the south. In this regard, the draft also recommended that the Lebanese government take all necessary measures in order to establish security arrangements that would support the sovereignty of the Lebanese state and security in the south and prevent cross-border infiltration, in addition to achieving Israel's withdrawal from all Lebanese territory.

Under the article dealing with the political system, the conference charged a government of national unity with forming a constituent council that would contain the various forces and orientations in the country. The council would draw up the constitution for the Lebanon of the future during a period not to exceed 1 year. The council would study the creation of whatever new centers and institutions would be appropriate, including a senate.

The conference decided to adopt the following reforms, until the implementation of the constitution:

1. The elimination of sectarianism in public employment, with the exception of posts of the first rank, it being stipulated that such posts will be evenly and equitably distributed between Christians and Muslims, and that the situation with regard to this rank will be resolved within a year.

2. Emphasis will be placed on the authority of the cabinet and at the same time the provisions of the constitution that spell out the powers of the president of the republic will be observed, insofar as there is no conflict with the written text. The cabinet will be considered the supreme executive and administrative authority in the state. It will consist of the president of the republic, who will preside, the prime minister, and the ministers, and it will exercise all its executive and administrative powers as set forth in the constitution.

3. The prime minister will be elected by the Chamber of Deputies with a relative majority. He will then carry out parliamentary consultations in order to form the cabinet. With the agreement of the president of the republic, a proposal will be drawn up with the names of the ministers. After that, the decrees will be issued. If during these 7 days the president of the republic refrains from issuing the decree appointing the cabinet, the prime minister will refer the matter to the Chamber of Deputies. If the chamber supports the position of the prime minister with an absolute majority, then the president of the republic will be legally required to issue the decrees.

The issuing of all decrees and draft laws will be done jointly by the president of the republic, the prime minister, and the concerned minister. Their signatures will be borne by all decrees, save those appointing the prime minister, which affirm the choice of the Chamber of Deputies.

The resignation of the cabinet will be accepted or the ministry will be considered to have resigned in the following cases:

- A. If the prime minister resigns
- B. If the Chamber withdraws its confidence from it
- C. If half of the cabinet members resign

With regard to the prime minister, the draft went on to say the following:

The prime minister will enjoy all the powers that he practices customarily. Ministers will be removed on the basis of a suggestion from the prime minister and with the agreement of the president of the republic.

The prime minister will oversee and follow the work of the ministers, in addition to overseeing the execution of the cabinet's decisions.

The president of the republic will have 30 days in which to sign the draft decrees approved by the cabinet or return them for justifiable reasons. This period will begin on the date when the drafts are deposited at the general directorate of the presidency of the republic. If the prime minister and the concerned minister insist on a bill, it will be sent to the cabinet, where a decision will be made on it. The prime minister will have half the period, starting on the date it is deposited with him.

With regard to the Chamber of Deputies, President al-Jumayyil's draft stated that the speaker of the chamber would be elected for 2 years. In addition, the number of deputies would be raised to 120, with half going to the Muslims and half to the Christians. In addition, the following reforms are to be undertaken:

1. A constitutional court
2. A socio-economic council
3. Administrative decentralization and the redistribution of the provinces
4. The adoption of popular representation in the provincial councils
5. The transfer of the largest possible number of administrative tasks from the central authorities to the local authorities
6. The re-examination of the recently issued legislative decrees
7. A new nationality law, the resolution of pending cases, and the formation within 1 year of courts specializing in handling such issues
8. An end to the mentioning of a person's sect in his identification

The draft emphasized the area of security. It called for the adoption of democratic methods for solving internal conflicts, the elimination of armed manifestations, the dissolution of the militias, keeping the army out of internal conflicts, and the adoption of new laws concerning it.

The draft said certain things ought to be carried out immediately. In order of priority, they are as follows:

1. The return of the refugees, both owners and renters
2. An investigation into the events in the suburb
3. Reinforcement of the security forces in terms of both men and materiel
4. The release of the kidnapping victims
5. The assurance of the citizenry's freedom
6. The mobilization of the departments of the state
7. Rapid repair of the water, telephone, and electricity networks
8. The formation of an information committee that would lay the proper foundations for the public and private media
9. The lifting of censorship from newspapers
10. The national unity government should ask the Chamber of Deputies for exceptional powers for 6 months
11. After 6 months, the third session of the dialogue conference should be held in Beirut, in order to take stock of what shall have been implemented.

After this draft had been read, there was an uproar. Rashid Karami tried to sum up the discussions by saying, "We are agreed...Congratulations."

Former President Sulayman Franjiyah confronted him by sharply objecting to the election of the prime minister by an absolute majority. He said, "I absolutely and irrevocably refuse to see the powers of the president of the republic be stripped away and given to the prime minister." He went on sharply: "Let someone tell me the name of the one prime minister in the last 41 years who was dismissed or whose authority was opposed."

Both former Prime Minister Salam and former Prime Minister Karami tried to mitigate his opposition. They encouraged Franjiyah to come into harmony with the proposal, but he responded with the same sharpness, "If you want to reap gains at our expense, we will reject that. I am basically opposed to sectarianism. I stood up last Sunday when the discussion at the conference took on a sharply sectarian character. However, when this subject is presented in this barefaced manner, then I am not ready to concede a single atom from my sect's account."

Former President Camille Sham'un praised former President Franjiyah's remarks, which he thought expressed both his opinion and that of the Lebanese Front. He called for the amendment of some points having to do with the powers of the prime minister in order to preserve the authority of the president of the republic unimpaired.

The Share of the Shi'ah Was Given to the Sunnis

Nabih Birri felt that he had been left outside the bazaar by this formula. A source close to him leaked his resentment at the results of the conference. The president of the Amal Movement, who has fought and been at the center of the recent events and developments, found that he had been deprived of everything he had achieved in order to strengthen the position of the Sunnis, who took no real part in the events. All he gained was a change in the term of the speaker of the Chamber of Deputies from 1 year to 2 years!

As for Walid Junblatt, he acted as if the matter did not concern him. Observers close to him said he was absolutely certain that the result would be nothing more than a truce that would allow everyone a chance to catch his breath...and look anew for ways out and solutions.

The Failure of the Conference

Until 2 pm last Tuesday (20 March 1984), when these lines were written, the side meetings were continuing following Franjiyah's surprising opposition.

Until 2 pm, two main options were being discussed. The first was to re-examine the proposal made by President al-Jumayyil and amend the powers of the prime minister in order to preserve the authority of the president of the republic. The second was a draft resolution suggested by Shaykh Pierre al-Jumayyil. It was an announcement of the ending of the state of war and of the initiation of efforts to return life in the country to normal. Thereafter both a government of national unity and a constituent committee would be formed. The latter would include all the sects. It would study and deal with the current points of disagreement.

No matter what results those attending the conference will come away with, it has already failed in the eyes of observers.

"After 8 days in a row, those attending the conference in search of reconciliation came away disagreeing."

This is how one political observer summarized the situation. That statement is not far from the truth.

The opposition, which cherished the hope that it would reap gains commensurate with its military victories on the ground, was disappointed. Its proposals were not approved.

The Lebanese Front considered everything that was and would be taken from it, even though it is not essential to have been seized under pressure.

The Lebanese state, which thought that it would come away victorious and coherent, has not achieved its desires. The price President Amin al-Jumayyil paid when he cancelled the 17 May accord was not commensurate with the profit he hoped to gain from the results of the Lausanne conference.

As for Syria, it played a card in favor of the Christians in 1976 and another in favor of the opposition grouping in 1983-1984. It is now faced with new choices that will emerge in the coming months. Since those at the Lausanne conference have accepted this result after 8 days of dialogue, each faction will wait for the right opportunity on the international and regional levels in order to improve and strengthen its positions.

Will that be a Syrian-Israeli war, in which Israel will play the role of security policeman?

Or will Damascus choose to back one faction over another, thereby allowing things to be decided?

At any rate, the observers here in Lausanne are not forgetting the role of the United States, which has said repeatedly that though it has made a tactical retreat from Lebanon, it has not left it once and for all. It has 1001 ways in which it can return. Moreover, as Arab and western diplomatic circles have reported, Washington has said more than once that the solution to the Lebanese issue might come before the presidential election.

Will the solution be international or Atlantic? Will Lebanon finally enter the age of the hundred years war?

At any rate, the Lausanne conference was not the solution.

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WEST BANK ARAB WOMEN'S COMMITTEES SURVEYED

Jerusalem AL-FAJR in English 7, 21 Mar 84

[7 Mar 84 p 16]

[Part I of Article by Nura Sus: "Woman Power in Palestine"]

[Text]

The Palestinian women's movement in the occupied territories, young but growing in all major towns and many villages and refugee camps, has carved out for itself important areas of activity in the social and cultural fields. Over the past year, especially, women's groups in the West Bank and Gaza have been visited by friends in solidarity, students and researchers seeking to know more about the local feminist movement, its orientation, organisation, methods and projects.

Four women's organisations are active in the occupied territories — the Women's Work Committee, the Working Women's Committee, the Palestinian Women's Committee and the Women's Committee for Social Work. Although each has a different approach, all four are committed to similar activities: sewing and literacy classes, kindergartens and children's day care, medical clinics and health education, folkloric bazaars and annual Women's Day celebrations.

There have been proposals for the fusing of the various groups into a united women's movement, which has yet to materialise. But, unique to other Palestinian national institutions, the women's committees now hold weekly meetings to coordinate efforts and plan joint events. They staged combined demonstrations in 1983-84 to protest an Israeli

ministrial plan to move the refugee camps and to express solidarity with striking women prisoners in Neve Tertza. Other coordinated work has been done on cases of women under town arrest, in association with an Israeli anti-Zionist women's group.

The task of organising women for collective interests and leading them to organise themselves is hard and slow work, committee members say, especially where traditional, patriarchal traditions pull strongest — in tight, family-oriented, religious communities where women have only played traditional roles of wife and mother. Encouraging women to break away from a dependent life is possible only by providing alternatives; thus the women's committees try to complement one activity by another: child care frees women to leave the home to attend self-improvement classes; sewing classes can give women a basic skill for outside jobs; and health information helps self-reliance.

In this week's issue *Al Fajr* surveys the 1983-84 projects of two larger women's groups which, not coincidentally, have been active the longest — the Women's Work Committee and the Working Women's Committee (Union of Palestinian Committees for Women Workers).

[21 Mar 84 p 16]

[Part 2 of Article by Nura Sus: "Woman Power in Palestine"]

[Text] Women's Committee for Social Action

Almost two years after its establishment, the WCSA has 15 centres in the cities of Nablus, Tulkarm, Jenin, Gaza, Rafah and Ramallah, in the villages of Kobar, Beit Ummar (20 members), and in the refugee camps of Jalazon, Kalandia (120), Shufat (40), Aida and Dheisheh (40).

Social and entertainment activities dominated their 1983-84 agenda although pre-schools, literacy classes and handicraft courses were also begun by a few local committees during the year. It is the only one of the four women's organisations which makes an outright appeal on religious grounds as well. For example, religious classes were included in the Kalandia summer camp, clothes and sweets were distributed in Tulkarm on Muslim feast days and pre-schoolers from Dheisheh were taken to *al-Aqsa* Mosque on their first field trip. Organisation of working women or union activities were not mentioned in the past year's programme other than a solidarity visit to women in Tulkarm sewing factories to distribute flowers on Women's Day.

There were many day trips to various regions in Palestine under a programme called 'Know Your Country' and two summer camps for children. Social visits and celebrations — for Prisoners' Day, Women's Day, Children's Day and religious feast days — are an important function for the committees; regular visits are paid to families of

political prisoners and especially the needy in the camps. Victims of last year's still unexplained mass poisoning phenomenon and gunshot victims were visited in hospital. Parties were given for graduating *tawjihi* students. Relief work is carried out by volunteer workers who clean and solicit donations of clothes, money and medicine to distribute to the poor — a method of aid not popular with the other women's committees which are more project-oriented.

Characteristic of the WCSA's all-around approach in encouraging membership is the Ramallah committee's inauguration of a physical fitness course and plans to establish an exercise centre for women, the first ever in the occupied territories.

Four pre-schools were set up in three refugee camps (Dheisheh, Shufat, Jalazon) and in Dhahriya, enrolling more than 300 children. Only the Jalazon camp committee, one of the most active, ran a literacy class last year but four committees have made it a priority for this year's work. Again in contrast to the emphasis of the other women's organisations on teaching marketable skills, the WCSA runs only one embroidery class (Jalazon), one knitting class (Shufat — 170 members) and one sewing class (Beit Ummar — 15). The major hindrance for the committees was the lack of centres, or even a room, to hold meetings and classes. Plans to rent space are on the agenda.

Palestinian Women's Committee

The Palestinian Women's Committee's activities for the year indicate that a smaller but cohesive group of women activists directs the work, described in their literature as in the "social realm, production, culture/education, unionisation, health and folklore and art."

The committees have chapters in Gaza, refugee camps (Jabaliya, Rafah and Khan Yunis) and run by women. There are two in Hebron and one in Dheisheh camp.

Nahalin, Beit Sahour, Battir, Jerusalem, Ramallah, Bir Zeit, Ni'lin, Jalazon camp, Beit Rima and Taluza, in the Nablus area. Core groups are also beginning in Aboud, Beit Illu, Deir Ammar, Beit Awwa and Deir al-Assad.

The committees, according to their public relations spokesperson, have recruited many members from the nursing community — 35 nurses are active members — and many of the activities are health-related. Three first aid courses were given (the latest, in Wadi Joz, is a three-month course with 10 women enrolled) which staff nurses from Augusta Victoria and Makassed Hospitals teach twice weekly. In Nahalin, for example, a lecture on prenatal care was given to the community, health education films shown, a free medical treatment day sponsored and a medical clinic set up, offering a range of services.

The committees meet regularly and differences between the women's organisations active in the occupied territories are more evident in these internal discussions. The PWC stresses the importance of group discussion of books and current events and devotes at least a 30-minute discussion for this during meetings.

The committee held a Women's Day celebration this year at their Jerusalem headquarters and a three-day bazaar at the Nadi Silwan March 16-18 to which all committees contributed food and hand-made articles for sale. Books, posters and cassettes were also available, as well as publications by the committee, including a new magazine.

CSO: 4400/222

WEST BANK COUNCIL OF HIGHER EDUCATION FACES PROBLEMS

Jerusalem AL-FAJR in English 14 Mar 84 p 10

[Text]

The long-term occupation coupled with, not coincidentally, the lack of any higher national body to plan, execute, supervise and improve higher education has allowed a situation of confusion, duplicity of effort and waste to exist in universities established and expanded on personal initiative.

The need to coordinate efforts and programmes became imperative when a number of new colleges and programmes were introduced to the five local universities without any attention to community needs. For example, two colleges of engineering were established almost simultaneously at neighbouring Najah and Bir Zeit Universities, despite the glut of unemployed engineers locally.

Council of Higher Education

In 1977 Palestinian educators responded to an initiative by the federation of West Bank professional unions to establish a Council of Higher Education for the occupied territories. Today, seven years later, education officials boast that they have established some semblance of order but admit to being far from their goals and unable to carry out all their plans.

The council is a 32-member body composed of representatives from the universities and from various national institutions. Sitting on the council are university administrators, mayors of university cities, representatives from the professional unions federation, from the charitable associations federation, from UNRWA-run educational institutes and *Inash al-Usta* women's society. Three

Palestinian academics chosen by the council and, recently, representatives of the university faculty unions have also been added.

The council's original mandate was to plan all aspects of higher education, including coordinating programmes and colleges based on studied needs of the area, unifying academic curricula, standardising university regulations and hiring policies and creating criteria for scholarship choices, as well as monitoring the post-university status of graduates.

The council is responsible for member universities, which include Bir Zeit, Najah, Bethlehem, Hebron and Abu Dis Universities and the Islamic University of Gaza, the Arab colleges of Nursing, UNRWA's three vocational training centres (all closed last month by UNRWA) and Hebron's Polytechnic.

According to CHE officials, higher education institutions wishing to become members must meet certain academic and educational requirements.

Anton Sansour noted that the plethora of private community colleges — the newest West Bank fad — are not council members, nor does the council have anything to do with them.

Given its situation of almost no resources, neither does the council fulfill the role of a ministry of education; CHE's only concern and influence over pre-school, elementary, preparatory and secondary schools is strictly on the basis of private initiatives.

Funding

Since its establishment, the CHE has worked hard on securing funds for

universities through the federation of Arab universities, Arab governments and private Arab and international organisations. A collective fund has been established in Amman to receive contributions from outside the West Bank. It is CHE's control of the fund which gives it a measure of control over the member universities, as well as providing a financial cushion to member universities when their own funding sources suddenly stop.

Anton Sansour, president of Bethlehem University and the present head of the CHE, says that the council is now moving from the difficult period of foundation to developing and executing recommendations for the development of higher education: "We have had a difficult time in the past six years between problems with the occupation and internal problems within the universities." Sansour explained that each Palestinian university has its special circumstances and restrictions. "We did not begin with the council and then establish the universities. We came along after most of them were established and set in their ways."

Samir Katbeh, former head of the West Bank Physicians' Union and the present executive director of the council, emphasises the need for overall planning: "In normal circumstances, an education plan is included in an overall national development plan. Under occupation we not only lack an overall development plan but we have no control even of the lower educational process." Katbeh pointed out that the CHE was at a disadvantage even before it put in the first day of work: "There is absolutely nothing we can do, for example, regarding the teaching curriculum and administration of lower educational institutions."

Rough Times

Problems with local universities and Palestinian communities were laid at the council's door from its start. Many of them, especially the small universities, complained that the decisions of the council were controlled by the leading universities and ultimately favour them. As the council started carrying out its duties and executing decisions, universities' complaints increased.

One complaint that riddled the council for years was against its composition. A series of articles was published in *Al Quds* daily in '79 and '80 complaining that the council was not representative enough of areas like Jenin and Jericho. Hafez Touqan, from Nablus, wrote that the council should be left only to "academic experts."

Anton Sansour admits that the structure of the council membership is not ideal: "But under occupation we have a different kind of situation to deal with," he said. Appeals from Jenin that a representative from their city be included on the council were answered. "According to our bylaws the council has three seats for leading Palestinian academics," said Sansour. "We appointed (Bir Zeit professor) Kamal Abd al-Fatah, from Jenin, as one of these members." To answer complaints of control by bigger universities, the council agreed to a rotating system of heads. Bir Zeit University's acting Vice President Baramki, the council's first president, was succeeded by Najah's Munther Salah, and now Bethlehem's Sansour is president.

The council also had to live with the fact that a number of mayors, members of the council, could not attend meetings because of town arrests.

Coordination

With earlier problems behind them the council started work on the important issue of coordination and long-term programmes. In 1981, consultants Norman Hunt, from Britain, and W. Pocok, from the US, were invited to the area by CHE, studied the situation and presented recommendations. Among their suggestions was the appointment of a full-time staff to run the council's research and executive work.

A small staff is now working with current executive director Samir Katbeh but according to him, CHE needs a highly professional staff that can carry out research and give recommendations.

The council has established nine evaluation committees consisting of 32 academicians from all the Palestinian universities. Their job is to study the academic situation, give recommendations and review implementation. To date these committees have not come

up with set recommendations. Part of the problem is the fact that the committee members are full time academics, busy with their own work loads. "What we need is for universities to sacrifice some of their leading faculty to work on this research full-time," said Dr. Katbeh.

For the time being the Higher Council's work regarding the academic programmes is merely stop-gap. "We are successful now in making sure that no new colleges or departments are added without the approval of the council," boasted Sansour.

University Problems

The creation and development of the CHE has not reduced problems within Palestinian universities. During the past months education in almost every higher education institute was disturbed. A dispute between students and administration over a grading system at Bir Zeit University disturbed classes there for a couple of days. In Hebron University, English language studies have been at a halt for months because of problems over foreign faculty signing Israeli work permits. Najah University and the UNRWA-run colleges have been closed "until further notice."

CHE officials reject the charges

that they are not doing anything regarding these problems. "We have no executive power and anyway we cannot solve problems between students and administrations," said Anton Sansour. "The only power we possess is recommending the distribution of funds earmarked for Palestinian universities and even in this we are often bypassed by universities who have other sources of funding."

Higher education officials insist that they do attempt to solve problems at various institutions. "But our efforts are made privately and not officially," they were quick to say. Council officials have been trying to unify university bylaws in order to decrease frictions at various universities.

But one education official told *Al Fajr* that some universities with 'good' bylaws have problems and others with 'bad' bylaws have no problems: "Every university has its special problems, stemming from its immediate environment and the various factional and political elements which exist throughout the occupied territories."

Current CHE president Anton Sansour said educational priorities for the area were for educationally sound community colleges, up-to-date libraries, including a national library, and the need for qualified, specialised faculty.

AL-FAJR SURVEYS WEST BANK MAGAZINES

Jerusalem AL-FAJR in English 28 Mar 84 pp 8-9

[Article by Awad Abdel Fattah: "Palestinian Magazines: Platforms for Literary Expression and Political Analysis"]

[Text]

In the last few years, eight different magazines have appeared in the occupied territories, all based in Jerusalem. Each magazine has fought its own battle with the Israeli authorities and succeeded to push its way through political and financial obstacles. Under military law used by the Israelis, permits are required from the government before any publication can appear. Owners waited a minimum of two years for an answer from the Israeli authorities; even then only a small percentage of applications are approved. Once that major roadblock is passed, a second permit is needed from the military government to distribute a publication to its major audience in the West Bank and Gaza Strip. Since 1979, when the new regulation was introduced by the Israelis, no magazine has received the permit to distribute outside Jerusalem.

All magazines, along with newspapers, without exception fall under the same restrictions of censorship. However, some editors claim that their magazines are more censored and restricted than others which they say are 'not radical.' An example which is often brought up is *Al Shira* magazine which was closed down in August 1983 by the Israeli authorities without explanation. *Al Shira* was known among Palestinians as the most critical magazine in the occupied territories.

While the Palestinian newspapers deal mainly with news and daily events as they relate to the Palestinian cause

and people, the role of the magazines is confined to analysing these events and researching local issues. Each magazine is different in its approach on almost every issue and to some extent reflects different political trends.

Some appear to be absolutely loyal to what they have lately started to call 'Palestinian legitimacy,' and consequently this political stand is reflected in coverage of important issues. Other magazines likewise committed to the general policy of the PLO are often critical of particular political steps which they might view as a shift in political perspective.

Most of the magazines in the occupied territories are owned by individuals or families who unilaterally decide the policy of the magazine. Journalists who have a political line sharply different from that of the magazines' owners must work within the framework of the already decided policy of the magazine. However, more liberalism is shown by the magazines than by the newspapers towards journalists and writers of different political persuasions. This is partially due to the fact that about half of the existing magazines are literary and cultural.

Concerning the development of the magazines in the occupied territories, journalists believe that the magazines in general have made great strides in form and content and in attracting readers. "Their level is even higher than those elsewhere in the Arab world," says editor of *Al Fajr al-Adabi* Ali Khalili.

Literary Magazines

There are two literary magazines published in Jerusalem: *Al Fajr al-Adabi* (Literary *Al Fajr*) and the eight-year-old *Al Bayader al-Adabi* (Literary Threshing Floors), the first literary publication since 1967.

As the first, *Al Bayader al-Adabi* drew the interest of most of the leading writers in the occupied territories, who contributed to *Al Bayader* on a voluntary basis. A five-member editorial staff conducted the magazine's affairs. "Our purpose," said Jack Khazmo, "was to publish local literary efforts and boost the literary movement in the occupied territories." According to writers and readers, *Al Bayader al-Adabi* was widely read in the first three years of its publication. But political differences between the editorial staff and regular contributors, as well as the appearance of other literary and cultural magazines, caused a sharp drop in sales. In the last three years or more *Al Bayader* has been produced by Jack Khazmo, his wife and one other journalist. (Effort was also siphoned into a second Khazmo publication in 1981, *Al Bayader al-Siyassi*, see below).

The magazine reduced in size from 68 to 48 pages and today only 20 percent of the material is locally written. This has been the main criticism of the magazine from journalists and writers in the occupied territories. They agree that the material published is 'good quality' but argue it should concentrate on local work.

Al Bayader's editorial staff explain that the artistic level of the writers has fallen and they no longer have the financial capability to pay writers who might work for them.

Al Fajr al-Adabi is published by *Al Fajr* daily newspaper and edited by writer Ali Khalili. It appears monthly in book form with 120 pages. On its inside cover it publishes works by local Palestinian artists every issue. Apart from this there are few pictures or graphics.

The first issue of *Al Fajr al-Adabi* as an independent monthly literary magazine appeared in March 1982. It stands on four principles which are emblazoned on the first page of every issue: "Toward a Palestinian progressive literary movement in the occupied territories; to

promote our local literature everywhere and to keep our distinct literary voice in existence; and to maintain contact with the international and Arab literary movement."

Al Fajr al-Adabi started as regular pages in *Al Fajr* Arabic daily. Until 1980 it appeared twice weekly, carrying short stories and poems. From 1980 to 1982 it appeared as an independent monthly supplement distributed with the daily paper. Ali Khalili brought it out as an independent magazine so that all the works he receives from writers and poets could appear.

Ali Khalili, who is the sole supervisor of the magazine, said that he gives first priority to the work of local writers and poets, including amateurs. According to him about 90 percent of each issue originates locally. The rest of the space is dedicated to Arabic and international literature. "My purpose," he explained, "is to encourage beginning writers and help develop the Palestinian literary movement in the occupied territories." He admits that this has kept the readership low.

Because literature is not seen as having a direct influence on the daily life of the Palestinians and general politics, there is no restriction by the administration on the choice of material. Writers of various political directions have access to *Al Fajr al-Adabi*. Ali Khalili says that he is the one who decides the content. "I open the magazine to national and progressive literature, and exclude reactionary literature," he remarks.

Beside the short stories and poems which are published in *Al Fajr al-Adabi*, there are regular short studies and interviews with Palestinian writers, poets or literary critics. Another regular feature are critiques of literature in the occupied territories. *Al Fajr al-Adabi's* staff is composed of local poets and writers working on a voluntary basis.

Al Kateb

Al Kateb defines itself as a literary, cultural and political magazine. On one corner of the cover, under the name of the magazine, is the motto "For Human Culture and Progress." In talking about the magazine, the editor, Jamil Salhout, hurries to explain the motto. "What we

mean by human culture," he said "is progressive human thought which serves humanity and reinforces human relations among all the world's peoples. And what we mean by progress is to be hostile to imperialism in all its forms."

Al Kateb started publication in 1979 after it obtained a license following a decision issued by the Israeli High Court. The decision followed two years of waiting and battles with the Israeli authorities. In the first issue of the magazine, an introduction was published about the difficulties faced in getting the publishing license. The Israeli authorities' allegation was that the applicant, Assad al-Assad, present editor-in-chief of the magazine, was an active member of the banned Palestinian Communist Party.

The magazine started with very poor financial resources. It is still based in a two-room office in al-Ram, a Jerusalem suburb. Despite this, what began mainly as a literary outlet continued to develop and expand both in form and content although it has retained its characteristic booklet size.

The editors say that their magazine differs in substance from other local literary magazines. "We try to publish only good literature," Bassam Salhi, one of the editors, told *Al Fajr*. Neither do they focus on writers-in-exile nor on fledgling writers.

Al Kateb is known for its publication of Palestinian prisoners' literature on a regular basis. The editorial staff is planning to issue a special supplement on literature by prisoners on April 17, 'Day of the Prisoner.'

Among regular columns of the magazine are: interviews with well-known Palestinian writers or poets, critiques of literature, articles on Palestinian culture and poems and studies on different subjects. Analytical, political or social articles appear in the first half of the magazine. Like any other magazine, there is an editorial which is usually decided on jointly by the seven-member editorial staff.

Al Kateb periodically publishes excerpts from Marx's works or from Marxist thinkers. Works by writers and poets of international reputation are also published on a regular basis.

Last year *Al Kateb* sponsored a symposium on the conditions of the

Palestinian working class in the occupied territories in which a large number of leading unionists and academics took part. About 50 pages of the 160-page magazine were dedicated to the subject.

Policy and decision-making is decided equally by the staff. "We have collective work here," said Bassam Salhi. "The magazine is not owned by anybody, and we don't work to make money." Jamil Salhout said none of the editorial staff are employed full-time; they only receive symbolic salaries. In response to criticism that *Al Kateb* is a magazine for the intelligentsia and has no 'light' or frivolous columns, Salhout said: "We are under occupation and the tasks we face are very heavy. This is why our paper is serious."

Political Magazines

Unlike the literary magazines, whose readership is limited, Palestinian political magazines have wide circulation. The political magazines have special importance in local political life, and more attention and work goes into the political magazines. Their format and layout is more sophisticated and all have colour photographs on their covers. Competition is sharp, particularly between the two leading weeklies, *Al Bayader al-Siyassi* and *Al Awda* (The Return).

Al Bayader, was first issued by the editorial staff of *Al Bayader al-Adabi* in 1981 and is generally considered to be better produced than the newer *Al Awda*. The contents of the two magazines are similar. *Al Bayader* has shifted its position closer to Jordan. *Al Bayader* called repeatedly for PLO Chairperson Yasir Arafat to go quickly to Amman and to conduct negotiations before recent PLO-Jordan summits without preconditions. *Al Awda* maintained a more reserved line.

Both regularly report on the present Palestinian situation, the situation in Lebanon, the situation in the occupied territories and Israeli settlement policy. Medical, social, cultural and educational institutions in the West Bank are well-covered and there are features on Palestinian villages all over the country. The Israeli peace forces and the internal

situation in Israel and current news also get attention. *Al Awda* has dedicated more attention to features about issues related to the Palestinians within the 1948 borders of Israel. Palestinian villages, land confiscation and discriminatory policy against local Arab councils are among these issues. "We see it as necessary," said Ibrahim Qara'in, one of the editors of *Al Awda*, "to make the Palestinian residents of the West Bank aware of the conditions of their brothers in the Galilee, the Triangle and the Naqab." According to him, their policy is to concentrate on the local issues and not to reprint articles from other Arabic newspapers.

The policy of the magazine is made and managed at a weekly meeting of the seven-member staff Radwan Abu Ayyash, another editor, said. The editorial is governed by the general policy of the Jerusalem-based Palestine Press Office, which issues *Al Awda*.

Al Bayader employs 25 people, according to editor Jack Khazmo, and all editorial decisions are taken by the three founders of the magazine. "Each one of the staff has his own job," he said, explaining the situation.

Neither magazine publishes articles dealing with issues raised by the Palestinian left.

Al Ahd (The Oath) is the newest magazine in the West Bank. It appeared on the streets at the very end of 1983. It has appeared fortnightly since then and is published by *Al Mithaq*.

Al Ahd is not in competition with the other magazines and does not have the same production standards. Its content clearly reflects the political perspective of the opposition within the PLO although some mainstream opinions have appeared. According to readers its radicalism is one of the main reasons it is attracting growing interest. Commenting on this, Mahmoud Khatib told *Al Fajr* that *Al Ahd* "is giving opportunities to journalists and writers who are deprived of writing in other newspapers and magazines." According to him, some contributors work for free and others receive symbolic pay.

Al Ahd's lack of money and staff are reflected in poor production and the shortage of features on local issues.

About 50 percent of the 60-page magazine is dedicated to political and ideological articles about the Palestinian cause, leadership and Arab issues.

In response to a question about why there is very little coverage of local issues, the editor said most of its material is censored. "We are forced to fill the space with articles from Arab magazines and papers," he said.

Al Ahd has come to be known in the occupied territories for its left position. Some people even accuse it of being "extreme and unreasonable." The editors of the magazine are aware of their critics but say they "don't care."

"Let them say whatever they want," Khatib said. "We are writing for all parties. We keep a balanced and objective magazine. The Palestinian masses should know everything."

The magazine is not yet organised into a standard format. There are no regular columns. There are also no formal editorial meetings to discuss content. Khatib said usually writers suggest ideas for articles or feature stories to him. "It is not me as an individual who decides on everything that is published in *Al Ahd*," he elaborated.

Al Ahd's editorial usually is very strong and when being critical of the "rightist leadership in the PLO" is "very harsh and sometimes lacks the rules of objective criticism," in the view of a journalist on another paper.

Until two years ago, there was no organ for the Palestinian Islamic institutions and groups in the occupied territories. There was an Islamic magazine from the 1950s until the Israeli occupation of the West Bank and Gaza Strip. But like other Palestinian newspapers, the new political conditions resulting from the Israeli occupation forced a halt to the magazine.

At the beginning of 1981 the Islamic *waqf* (charitable foundation) in Jerusalem decided to issue an Islamic magazine. After a one-year wait for a license it first appeared in 1982. The magazine is called *Huda al-Islam* (The Islamic Guide) and focuses on Islamic theological issues. It comes out in book-

let form with very few pictures but with much decoration on the frame of almost every page. Pictures are printed only with the regular feature stories, which are usually about Palestinian institutions in the occupied territories.

Huda al-Islam is the only Islamic magazine, not only in the 1967 occupied territories but in all of Palestine. "Our magazine is distributed in an parts of Palestine," said Sheikh Ikrima Sabri, the editor-in-chief. He added that the distribution is done privately through Islamic groups. According to him they distribute 10,000 issues; more than half of this number is to subscribers.

Huda al-Islam is the only Palestinian magazine which ignores politics. In all 16 issues which have so far been issued, there has not been a single article with a political theme. "We don't interfere in the politics of the PLO or the Arab countries," Sheikh Ikrima said. "We are living in times which are constantly changing. We don't want to support or praise some political side which might turn out to be bad the next day."

But they don't and even cannot ignore attacks on the Islamic holy places, such as the mosques. The magazine covered these events and provided analysis and comment. The series of attacks on *al-Aqsa*, the Hassan Beq Mosque in

Jaffa and the bloody attack on Hebron University last summer got full coverage in the magazine. When criticising the Israeli authorities, the magazine tries to use indirect terms, in an attempt to escape censorship.

The non-interference of the magazine in the politics of the West Bank and in politics in general does not mean that the five-member editorial staff do not have political views. But since it is an Islamic magazine, different Islamic issues are discussed and explained "in order to make Muslims aware of their religion and rule out any possibility of distorting it," said Kamel Qadi, one of the editors.

Although all the staff members are well-versed in the Islamic religion their contribution to writing work is very small. According to Kamel Qadi, most of the content is written by people outside the editorial group, who see their main task as to get material and respond to letters from readers. "So far," he said, "97 people of different educational levels have contributed." Those who write long researched articles are paid JD20 for each contribution.

Israeli censorship does not ignore this religious magazine. All material has to go to censorship. According to the editors, censored articles have dealt with Israeli practices in holy places and articles about *al-Jihad* (holy war).

STATUS OF NATION'S IMPORT LEVEL, INFLATION REVIEWED

London AL-MAJALLAH in Arabic No 212, 3-9 Mar 84 pp 46-48

/Article by Mahir 'Abbas: "The Saudi Minister of Commerce to AL-MAJALLAH: Sulayman al-Sadim: We have Started the Stage of Self Sufficiency and the Inflation Rate Is Zero"/

/Text/ I was confident about the kingdom's economic and trade situation before I held this frank conversation with Dr Sulayman al-Salim, the Saudi minister of commerce, but I came out of this conversation with greater confidence and security. Minister al-Salim gave AL-MAJALLAH explicit answers to its questions and did not resort to generalizations or enthusiastic expressions in his answers. Rather, he spoke in terms of specific facts, figures and statistics and in calm, scientific language. AL-MAJALLAH brought every question, anxiety and hope to the Saudi minister, and he put every document at its disposal, as well as dotting the i's. This conversation took place.

/Question/ In spite of the numerous economic and commercial issues that impose their presence at the beginning of this meeting, my mind is preoccupied with the statements repeated recently in our local press that specific cars that do not conform to official industrial specifications are entering the Saudi market. No doubt general anxiety has been prevailing in consumer circles since these rumors have been going about. What is the truth of the matter? If it is true, what guarantees are there to prevent such cars from coming in?

/Answer/ It seems that you are referring in particular to the picture of the crushed Japanese car, a Mazda, that local papers published recently. I would like to assure you that this event received my utmost attention and I personally took charge of following up on it through the ministers and the Saudi Arab Specifications and Standards Authority. We also held contacts at the highest level with the Japanese factories concerned. Let me move from general points to specifics, and state that among the people I met here in Riyadh and talked with in this regard was a delegation from the League of Japanese Automobile Manufacturers. We obtained all official information from this delegation, and the delegation provided material establishing, under its members' signatures, that the Japanese cars exported to Saudi Arabia have the same basic specifications that cars exported to other international markets,

especially in Europe and America, have--in fact, those the cars used in Japan themselves have. The ministry did not settle for this degree of confirmation; rather, we made contacts with European and American companies competing with the Japanese firms and the results which we obtained through these contacts show that there are no specific specifications by which cars exported to the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia or the countries of the Middle East in general are built. In the light of all this, we issued an announcement that the statements being circulated on this subject were not correct, and we published this statement in the local media, in the press and television. I would like to add to all that that the studies which have been made have proved that 80 percent of automobile accidents can be attributed to the driver himself, while 15 percent can be attributed to the car and 5 percent to road conditions. We affirmed that the crushed Japanese car which had provoked all this anxiety had conformed to the specifications which the Arab Specifications and Standards Authority had endorsed.

/Question/ Could you shed some light on price activity in the kingdom and its relationship to the policy of subsidizing basic commodities?

/Answer/ Before answering this question, I would like to refer the readers of AL-MAJALLAH to the material the British magazine ECONOMIST published recently on a comparative study of styles and levels of economic life in 23 countries, including the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. This study concluded that the inflation rate in Saudi Arabia is zero! However, the magazine attributed that to one factor, the massive subsidies the kingdom offers for foodstuffs and other basic commodities. Here I can say that the point the ECONOMIST magazine made corroborated the figures the General Statistics Department quoted to us, the most recent of which are the statistics for the months of last September and October, confirming that the annual change in prices in these 2 months was zero in comparison with the prices for the same 2 months of the year prior to 1983. However, the magazine was not correct in saying that that could just be attributed to subsidies and aid; this stability may be attributed in general to the economic policy followed and the nature of legitimate competition in the Saudi market. The role of subsidies was clear when the prices of basic commodities in international markets were high, but these prices have dropped now. With the change in the economic situation, we have resorted to reviewing subsidies, so that they will be directed toward the goal of encouraging local industries. I can mention one example that indicates the wisdom of eliminating subsidies on a specific commodity. We eliminated subsidies on imported frozen and refrigerated meat, but nonetheless prices did not change! Why? Because the importers agreed to put the pressure on the exporters, and the prices remained as they were. This gives proof that the people who benefitted from subsidies on such commodities were the exporters and not the consumers in the Saudi market. As an analogy to that, I can mention the following examples:

Local dairy farms became common, and we eliminated the stipulated subsidies for imported liquid milk.

We reduced the subsidies stipulated for imported cooking oils, and kept them in favor of local factories.

When the use of flour as fodder and the use of discarded bread for the same purpose became widespread, we raised the price of flour without changing the price of bread.

Saudi Openness

/Question/ The discussion of imported commodities and the elimination or retention of subsidies from one angle, which is the concern to subsidize local industry, brings us to a discussion about the extent to which Saudi Arabia is open to international products, and the relationship between this and the danger that imitation or counterfeit products might seep in. What is the Ministry of Commerce's plan to prevent such commodities from reaching the markets?

/Answer/ I agree with you that the Saudi market is open to imports coming from all countries of the world, except Israel and countries subject to Arab boycott resolutions. A number of years ago we noted that there were imitation goods in the Saudi markets, which inspired the fear that this phenomenon would be aggravated, especially with the period of world recession. In view of the difficulty and the lengthy period of the legal and judiciary measures against the phantom companies making the imitations, we concentrated on the statute to combat the commercial fraud, which is also in effect for imitation goods. We applied the necessary penalties with the cases of imitation that were discovered and exposed, the people committing these violations in the local papers. That is, the responsibility now lies basically with the importer, and this has led to an improvement in the general situation through fear of importers of penalties, a bad name and their obligation to re-export or destroy these fraudulent goods. This is on the local level. On the foreign level, we have made contacts at the highest levels, especially with the ministers of commerce in the countries of Southeast Asia, warned them of the gravity of this phenomenon and asserted the need to prevent these commercial practices if they really were concerned with the Saudi market. One result of these decisive contacts was the issuance of a number of statutes, bills and laws, especially in Nationalist China (Taiwan), to tighten the crackdown on imitators of genuine goods and punish them. This of course is in addition to the pressures the companies manufacturing the genuine goods exert on the countries which ignore the fraud. Thus I can assert that the phenomenon of the infiltration of imitation goods into the Saudi market has started to decline noticeably, and that represents a success for the efforts of the Ministry of Commerce in this area.

Self-Sufficiency

/Question/ Some people talk about the question of self-sufficiency in certain products during the present year, especially with the announcements you have made on self-sufficiency in the area of wheat. What is your opinion on this policy? What steps have you taken so far?

/Answer/ Let me begin my answer to this question with an important statement, which is that we are not striving for self-sufficiency in all areas, because,

as I said earlier, the Saudi market is open to international products. However, wheat, specifically, is a strategic commodity which enjoys subsidies in the interests of the producers and consumers. One result of this has been that producers have been encouraged to increase production rates, which has raised our expectations of the possibility of self-sufficiency in wheat production this year. A corresponding upsurge has occurred in egg production, which raises further expectations regarding self-sufficiency. In fact, we are now exporting some types and importing others. Poultry production has also registered a great increase. In the area of the cement industry, we will now be closer to self-sufficiency, in a few years. This also applies to the production of local oils. However, the Saudi market will remain open in order to guarantee competition with international industries, in a manner that will encourage local industries to progress further.

/Question/ The talk about this issue reminds me of the joint coordinating committees which operate on the basis of agreements concluded with a number of countries. What is these committees' role and its effect in encouraging trade?

/Answer/ Before I talk about the joint committees' role, let me stress once again that the freedom of the Saudi economy and the openness of the Saudi market are the basis of our dealings. The private sector plays the main role, except in the case of exports and imports in the area of oil and arms. This means that the joint committees' role is limited, because to eliminate obstacles to contacts among businessmen domestically and abroad. One thing that confirms this fact is that the Sudan is the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia's biggest partner in the trade field, since the kingdom is the greatest exporter to the Sudan and the biggest importer from it. In spite of that, there is no joint committee between us. Thus, the main idea behind that is that economic circumstances and market forces are what impose themselves on relations among countries with a free economy. The joint committees are content to facilitate general commercial contacts among the countries concerned.

/Question/ There remains a final question which goes beyond the local context to the broader regional one: what is your assessment of the economic course of the Gulf Cooperation Council countries?

/Answer/ I believe that this course has been successful so far. In fact, I can say that the council has taken more rapid steps than the European Common Market did in the first stage of its establishment and growth. The success of the council countries' economic course can be attributed to the fact that the steps which have been agreed to and carried out were carefully studied, and were not the offspring of extreme or sudden decisions. In addition, they were not aimed at creating a radical change in existing relations. To give proof of this success, it is enough to point out that the commercial barriers that still remain among council countries are very limited in terms of volume and number, and the council's task of eliminating them are now easy in nature. We now can see greater movement of goods and greater ease of the movement and transfer of capital labor today, especially as far as council country professionals go.

The 10 Greatest Countries Exporting to Saudi Arabia

Ten occupy the main position in the list of countries exporting to the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. According to the latest statistics these countries are as follows, ranked by volume of exports: the United States, Japan, West Germany, Britain, Italy, France, South Korea, Nationalist China and Belgium.

Saudi Arabia, between Exports and Imports

The value of imports in 1982 came to approximately 139 billion riyals, 25 percent of which were in the form of electrical equipment, 17 percent transportation equipment, 13 percent vegetables and food products, and the rest various materials and commodities.

Statistics are not yet available on exports for last year, but the 1982 statistics show that the kingdom's exports came to 271 billion riyals, mostly oil and oil products.

There are strong expectations that the value of non-oil exports will increase starting this year, in view of the start of the export stage in the Saudi petrochemical industries.

11887

CSO: 4404/405

NATION'S PROGRESS IN ACHIEVING AGRICULTURAL SELF-SUFFICIENCY REVIEWED

London AL-TADAMUN in Arabic No 50, 24 Mar 84 pp 57, 58

/Article by Samir al-Shaybani: "'Abd-al-Rahman Al Al-Shaykh, the Saudi Minister of Agriculture: Self-Sufficiency in Wheat This Year, and Other Agricultural Products Are Being Exported"/

/Text/ A person, whether he is a citizen, resident or visitor in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, will observe that there is a passionate return to farming, or more correctly to the land, as well as education, industry and construction.

The start of modern farming in the kingdom occurred 7 or 8 years ago, although it took slow steps, since gross wheat production at that time did not exceed 3,000 tons, that is, represented only 1 percent or less of the kingdom's self-sufficiency.

A quick glance at gross production last year, which exceeded 700,000 tons of wheat, will show the extent of the interest the kingdom is giving to this important sector, since the rate at which self-sufficiency has been attained in the basic bread for food is now greater than 90 percent. This figure, or this result, should indeed be considered a successful scientific leap forward for the kingdom. In a family meeting which took place between the minister of agriculture and water in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, 'Abd-al-Rahman Al al-Shaykh, and the faculty and student body at the Capital Model Institute in Riyadh, since the minister is one of the sons of this institute, and through his replies to the questions presented to him, the following information and facts were revealed on the state of agriculture in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia:

The kingdom's production this year is estimated at 1.3 million tons of wheat: "This will realize self-sufficiency in this major crop."

As regards other products, 8 years ago, for instance. the kingdom was producing only 10 percent of its poultry and poultry products consumption, while now the kingdom has realized self-sufficiency and has started exporting to neighboring countries, since its production this year exceeds 2 billion eggs; the same is the case with milk, meat and vegetables.

As regards dates, the palm has started to regain its "glory," and the number of date palms in the kingdom comes to 12 million. Thus the kingdom has become one of the three greatest date-producing countries in the world.

The agricultural sector in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia enjoys support that is unparalleled in any other country. Land is given out free of charge, aid is granted generously, sometimes coming to 50 percent of cost and production, the remaining percentage is covered by easy loans over a 10-years period, and agricultural guidance has reached every town and village. The government buys basic products like wheat and dates from farmers at prices that offer them encouragement.

Development of and attention to water resources are not only for the sake of agriculture but also for the sake of human consumption. Dozens of small, medium and large desalination plants have been erected on the Red Sea coast and on the Gulf to supply coastal and interior areas, and desalinated water has reached the heart of the peninsula, in Medina. Successive projects are being established to supply interior areas, now that the supply of the coastal areas has been completed; the most recent of these was the great project carried out to supply the city of Riyadh 2 years ago, when King Fahd ibn 'Abd-al-'Aziz opened the project to desalinate water which came to Riyadh on a 450-kilometer "trip" from the water of the Gulf. There are also large integrated groundwater projects, such as the great al-Washm water project, which will supply no less than 25 villages and towns. The great Sudayr water project, which will supply more than 75 towns and villages, is now being constructed, and there are many other projects under construction.

As regards groundwater, available information shows that that is becoming increasingly abundant. There are 900 test observation wells spread out over the kingdom as a whole, measuring not just the quantity of the rise or fall of the water but also its quality. For example, in the town of Harad and environs, there were 52 wells about 15 years ago, and the latest measurement of the water in these wells, a few months ago, showed that water in this area is now greater than it had been then.

At the end of the meeting, the minister stated that one of the kingdom's goals was the attainment of self-sufficiency in grain, principally wheat, to make reality of the motto of self-sufficiency.

It remains to point out that the statement by the Saudi minister of agriculture and water, who is also chairman of the board of the General Water Desalination Organization, was a minor part of the report he presented in this regard to King Fahd ibn 'Abd-al-'Aziz, which the king relied on in the statement which he made on the seventh of this month (March) in the town of al-Khubar, on the occasion of the opening of the water desalination and electric power plant in this town, which will cover the towns of the Eastern Province with desalinated drinking water. In this statement, King Fahd declared that the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia had produced 1.3 million tons of grain in the first quarter of this year, "and there is no doubt that that is

a leap which I had not expected would occur. However, God facilitates all difficulties facing man's endeavors, when they are determined and receive support from almighty glorious God. What has happened is due not just to the role of the officials but is also the role of the Saudi citizen, who is concerned to strive for everything that will uplift his country's status, so that he will be able to realize self-sufficiency in foodstuffs and fresh water."

11887

CSO: 4404/405

'LOST GENERATION' ISSUE DISCUSSED BY EMIGRE PAPER

Paris IRAN LIBRE in French 2 Apr 84 pp 1-2

[A weekly published by Azadeh Shafiq, daughter of Ashraf Pahlavi]

[Text] The international press continuously increases its investigations and reports on the ten-year-old children that the Khomeyni regime is sending to the front daily. Certainly, it is only too true that these unfortunates are living out a terrible drama, a drama the horror of which we ourselves have quite often mentioned. The battle of the Majnun islands will go down in history as one of the most despicable events of the 20th century. But we must not forget that for all that, alas, we are dealing here with only one of our people's stations of the cross. It is all Iranian youths who, on all levels, on account of the "imam," are victims of unprecedented genocide.

The first calamity that struck these youths from the very first days of the revolution was the break-up or dissolution of all family structures. Almost immediately after the departure of the king, in the face of the scope of the massacres ordered by the new regime, men and women tried to flee anywhere and by any means. It is not unusual today that the hazards of exile have led the father to live in America, the mother in Western Europe and the children in the Middle East, with only the grandparents remaining in Iran. Since the creation of the Islamic Republic, young Iranians no longer have either home or refuge and are raised outside of any structure or authority, entrusted to the government if they remain in the mother country or abandoned to themselves if they are abroad. Tens of thousands of them no longer even know where their parents are. We have a sad example of this with the prisoners of the Iraqi army who, no longer having any address to which they can legitimately write, can only send messages to their next of kin through the auspices of the Red Cross, hoping that their relatives will hear them.

To the moral poverty one must add the intellectual distress. In the Iran of subversion, it is practically impossible to pursue studies in depth. Outside the Koran, which must be chanted all day long, everything is suspect. There is no question of doing research on the Achemenides or the Sassanides. The pre-Islamic past of our country which, since antiquity, has been admired and envied by Westerners, is saddled with opprobrium and adversity in Tehran. It has become dangerous to reread our great classical poets whose work is completely impregnated with the ideals of our thousand-year-old monarchy. The mullahs also proscribe our contemporary history since they do not allow allusions to be made to the former kings, unless it is to damn and excommunicate them. In other words, under the best of hypotheses, Iranians of the new

generations will only be able to hope to attain the level of study of a seventh-century camel-driver. As for their comrades in exile, they are unfortunately not much better off. It is the lack of money which dooms them to ignorance and degenerateness. What can one do when one is forced to go to the markets at five o'clock in the morning to try to find work as a porter? Too many adolescents, formerly destined for the most brilliant future, now live in the United States, Great Britain and France in distress and despair. Their fate is all the more pitiful in that they find themselves back on a consumer society which, in spite of the crisis, continues to give them the example of idleness, abundance and waste. For them, bitterness and hatred are added to the disarray. They still are unaware that they are relatively privileged in comparison with their Middle Eastern compatriots, most notably in Turkey, who, forgotten by all, are stagnating in the most total destitution.

There certainly exists in London, in Paris, on the Riviera or in California, a small minority which has the possibility of living a normal existence. But cut off from its roots, this minority inescapably ends up, no matter what its loyalty and nationalistic convictions may be, by pushing its identity into the background and assimilating itself definitely into the environment where it lives. How many young people can presently perfect their Iranian culture in the West? How many of their children can even learn to write the alphabet of their language there?

Khomeyni, in his delirium, is preparing for us a Fourth-World state, debased and underdeveloped. When he passes away, our people will once again find themselves not only physiologically exhausted but intellectually prostrated. For the first time in its history, our nation will be without this élite, without which a nation is nothing. It will take years and years to correct the situation. Even the on-site reorganization of national education will not suffice unto itself. Everyone knows well that, for a child to blossom, the cultural level of his family circle counts at least as much as that of the teachers in charge of his education.

All Iranians must now understand it and do whatever is in their power to try, in spite of everything, to preserve the future and safeguard whatever can still be the future. A great work of mutual aid and cooperation must be carried out. We must reunite dispersed families, give young people reasons to believe and hope and, above all, allow them, despite the adversity of the times, to preserve their national heritage. We must know how, wherever we may find ourselves, to remain Iranians, not only in nationality but also in civilization. Our host countries, in their own interest of course, should help us fulfill this mission. They have everything to lose by seeing a class of disadvantaged, embittered people who have slipped down the social ladder proliferate on their soil. Hospitality is not enough, and yet it must be granted with dignity and generosity. It is only then that it is spiritually enriching for all. When a problem of refugees arises, there are two ways of handling it: the way chosen by the Middle Eastern Arab states with regard to the Palestinians, whom they have packed into camps; and the way practiced in the past by Iran under the monarchy and France, who fraternally welcomed all victims of despotism and tyranny. The first way leads inevitably to the worst aberrations. The second way creates indestructible ties of friendship and solidarity forever.

NOORANI TALKS TO THE MUSLIM, DISCUSSES POLITICAL ISSUES

Islamabad THE MUSLIM in English 11 Apr 84 pp 1, 6

[Article by Ashraf Hashmi]

[Text] KARACHI, April 10: Maulana Shah Ahmed Noorani, Chief of defunct Jamiat-e-Ulema Pakistan has said that the majority of political parties inside and outside the MRD have agreed in principle to launch a joint struggle for the realisation of the one-point programme suggested by his party.

He said that the negotiations conducted by JUP's special representative Shah Faridul Haq with leaders of other political parties like Jamaat-e-Islami, Tehrik-e-Istiqlal, Pakistan People's Party, National Democratic Party, Pakistan National Party, Muslim League (Pagara and Kh. Khairuddin group) and other political leaders have been very successful. All these leaders have expressed their support in principle for the proposed joint struggle for the realisation of the one-point programme which related to the holding of general elections in the country under 1973 Constitution.

Talking to The Muslim here at his residence today the Maulana said that some of these parties have stated that they would convey their formal approval after considering the issue in their Central Committees which are scheduled to meet by the end of this month. Thus, he said, the situation in this respect would be clear and if things moved on smoothly the grand assembly of the country's politicians would be held by early next month.

However, if the government, he said, did not allow the conference, the political parties which have agreed on the one-point programme would then issue a joint declaration in its support.

He said he was not adverse to the fou-point programme of the MRD and considered it as the true reflection of the aspirations of the people but there were some people who still maintained some reservations about the MRD programme. The one-point programme suggested by his party, he said, covered all the democratic demands. If the elections are announced under the 1973 Constitution these would be held on adult franchise and party basis and there would be no question of separate electorate, proportional representation participation of the registered and non-registered parties and any conditions for the candidates and for the voters in that case.

He said the '73 Constitution was an Islamic and federal constitution which was framed by an elected National Assembly with full agreement of the federating units so any arrangement made over and above the agreed document would not be acceptable to the people.

He said his party's stand on non-party polls was very clear as it would never take part in such elections. Party-less elections, he said were a negation of the '73 Constitution and would be meaningless. The Government, he added, was insisting on party-less polls only to perpetuate itself. The Government thought that only through the "National Assembly" constituted as a result of non-party polls it would be able to get a fresh mandate to continue in power.

He said the future of the country was at stake. The events happening around our borders were posing a direct threat to our existence and if sincere and serious efforts were not made to save the country the prevailing situation would ultimately lead to an armed struggle by the people. He cited the example of former East Pakistan where the people according to him [obvious omission to continuing page] cise.

Commenting on the President's plan to hold elections under an Islamic system the Maulana said that the Government had announced elections in 1977 and 1979. These elections, he said, were planned under the 1973 Constitution. If the planned elections of 1977 and 1979 were not Islamic how these could be now and if those were Un-Islamic then why they were planned. He said it was very simple to understand that the regime was exploiting the name of Islam only to serve its purpose. He said to him the question of holding of elections was not the real issue. The real issue, he said, was the transfer of power. The Government, he said may be interested in the holding of elections' but "it is not sincere in the transfer of power." He said in order to avoid transfer of power the regime wanted to have elections of its own liking so that the persons got elected to the National Assembly were willing to extend their vote of confidence to the regime.

The JUP's chief said that the regime has no right to amend the Constitution and it was not correct that the Supreme Court had accorded this right to the present Government. The Supreme Court, he said, was itself not empowered to amend the Constitution, then how could it give this right to a man or a group of persons. The Supreme Court, he said, accorded this right to the regime under the law of necessity only to hold free and fair elections within the time limit promised by the regime. That time has now gone and the Supreme Court's ruling was no more valid now.

He opposed the idea of increasing the powers of an indirectly elected President and formation of a National Security Council. He said an unelected President should not be given powers to dissolve an elected National Assembly and no institution should be made supreme to an elected parliament. All these issues, he said, were being raised to add confusion to the situation.

Talking about the Afghanistan problem Maulana Noorani said the "Government itself has created this issue at the instance of the Americans and their agents in the Islamic world." To him, he said, it was not an Islamic issue,

but if the Government insists that it was providing shelter to the Afghan refugees only in the name of Islam then what about those Pakistanis who were stranded in Dhaka and were passing a miserable life. "Why these innocent people should not be repatriated to their own country."

He said the "American agents in the Islamic world" were keen that Pakistan should provide shelter to the Afghan refugees but if they were really sincere to their cause then 'why don't they come forward and rehabilitate a part of these refugees in their own countries which have a much bigger area than Pakistan."

He said the Government should hold direct talks with the Karmel regime to solve the issue. He said: "if we could afford to talk with the Prime Minister of occupied Kashmir the late Sheikh Abdullah then why should we not open negotiations with Babrak Karmel." He said the Government should stop playing in the hands of the Americans and solve the Afghanistan question by opening direct talks with the Kabul regime.

[Passage missing] after losing all hopes of any a healthy democratic change in the governmental set-up of that day became frustrated and lost faith in their own country. This despondency, he said, had led them to an armed struggle and Mukti Bahni came into being. The country, he said, was facing a similar situation today and if immediate steps were not taken to restore the confidence of the masses the consequences would be disastrous.

Maulana Noorani ruled out the possibilities of any dialogue between the political parties and the Government and said: "We have had enough of them." He said in October last when his party's delegation met the President and the President had promised that he would announce some amendments in his August 12 programme after taking into the consideration the views of the political parties within a month. The promised announcement was never made and "nobody is aware as to what the government really intends to do." He emphatically said that there was now no question of opening a political talk with the Government as it would be a waste of time and a futile exer- [obvious omission]

CSO: 4600/522

OPEN COURT TRIALS FOR POLITICAL PRISONERS DEMANDED

Islamabad THE MUSLIM in English 11 Apr 84 p 6

[Text] LAHORE, April 10: Malik Mohammad Qasim, the Convenor, Political Prisoners Release Committee has said that the committee was not ready to accept the standards laid down for awarding punishments to political prisoners.

Addressing a press conference here today he said that if a convict or a denenu was guilty of an offence and there was sufficient evidence available against them they should be tried in an open court.

He appealed to the Organisation of the Islamic Conference, the Ammesty International, the U.N. Human Rights Commission and the Non-Aligned Movement to send the their representatives to see for themselves the treatment being meted out to the political prisoners. He referred to the decisions of the National Coordination Committee of lawyers to constitute a tribunal to look into the affairs of political prisoners and appealed to the committee to go ahead with the task at the earliest. He said that PPRC would give every assistance to the proposed tribunal in its work.

Malik Qasim regretted that a number of political leaders and workers undergoing incarceration were victims of multiple diseases but they were not being provided proper medical care and treatment.

Talking of the detention of Meraj Mohammad Khan, Khwaja Khairuddin, Ghulam Mustafa Jatoi, Nawabzada Nusrullah Khan Mumtaz Bhutto and Air Marshal (Retd) Asghar Khan he said their only fault was that they advocated restoration of the 1973 Constitution, holding of elections and induction of a representative government in the country. He said if any one of them was guilty of treason or any major offence or establishing links with any foreign country, he should be tried in an open court.

He said the Political Prisoners Release Committee "considers the sentences awarded by military courts as unconstitutional and illegal and demands that political prisoners should not be tried by these courts". He said the committee was of the considered opinion that it was inhuman to fetter the political prisoners and to keep them in torture camps.

He said all of them were extremely patriotic people and as such treatment given to them was uncalled for.

He said that similar committees would also be formed in other provinces within this year.

Commenting on the Nawabpur incident, Malik Qasim said it indicated that the law and order situation was very grave. He said if persons responsible for this incident were tried in a civil court they would have been awarded more severe and heavy punishments.

CSO: 4600/522

PPP SAID TO HAVE 'FULL FAITH' IN BENAZIR

Islamabad THE MUSLIM in English 11 Apr 84 p 8

[Text]

LAHORE, April. 10: There is no difference of opinion among workers of the defunct Pakistan Peoples Party on the visit of Miss Benazir Bhutto, acting Chairperson of the party, to the United States. Party workers have full confidence in her leadership and full back her statements made during her visit to America.

This was stated by Mansoor Malik, Senior Vice President of PPP Punjab, while talking to 'The Muslim' here.

Mansoor Malik said the Peoples Party firmly believed in bilateralism and non-alignment and added that relations with all countries could be established on the basis of these principles, whether the U.S. or the Soviet Union.

The PPP leader dispelled rumours that the visit of Miss Benazir had caused resentment and dismay. He said the acting Chairman had successfully pleaded for the restoration of democratic institutions in Pakistan and the dangers posed by the continuation of martial law at various forums during her stay in the United States. Her statements were in conformity with the policy of the party, he added, and there was no reason for any doubt about them.

Arif Iqbal Bhatti a member of the central committee of the party, when asked to comment on her

visit, expressed similar views. He said the party's policy was totally non-aligned and based on bilateralism, and advocating friendship with both the U.S. and the Soviet Union. He said the statement of the acting Chairman was more than sufficient, and the workers had full confidence in her leadership.

Meanwhile, Malik Meraj Khalid, a former Chief Minister and a prominent leader of the Party, has also said the statements of Miss Benazir were in conformity with the political, economic and social policies of the party. Further, she had strengthened the cause of the restoration of democracy and removed all doubts about the party's high command and the MRD struggle, he stated.

Expressed the hope that other parties outside the alliance would co-operate with the MFD on its four-point programme. He said from the national point of view, the tour of the acting PPP Chairman to America was very essential. He added that it was a really successful trip.

He said America was a super power, and to apprise the American people of the prevailing situation in the subcontinent, and particularly in Pakistan, was a political duty which had been fully performed by the acting Chairman.

He said there was no difference of opinion in the party on her visit, nor did any grouping exist within the party ranks.

CSO: 4600/522

PNP VOICES CONCERN OVER REGION'S MILITARIZATION

Islamabad THE MUSLIM in English 11 Apr 84 p 8

[Text]

LAHORE, April 10: The Central Working Committee of the defunct Pakistan National Party has condemned the imperialist strategy of using Pakistan for operations against Afghanistan and strongly criticised the present regime for playing this role.

The resolution expressed deep concern over the stepping up of militarisation of the region by the United States, which posed the gravest threat to peace and good neighbourly relations in South Asia and the Gulf region.

Another resolution condemned the alleged inhuman treatment meted out to political prisoners as a result of which many of them were already suffering from various diseases. They had not been provided with adequate medical care.

The resolution also criticised the trail of political prisoners in Hyderabad and other jails by military courts for protesting against the bad treatment and non-availability of medical aid. The committee demanded release of all political prisoners in view of the fact that the Government had failed

to provide them medical aid and their lives were in danger.

The committee also expressed deep concern over the arrest and trial of 38 workers of Pakhtunkhwa NAP in Baluchistan and condemned the issuance of warrants for the arrest of its leader, Mohamoud Khan Achakzai. It demanded release of all the arrested Pakhtunkhwa workers and withdrawal of the warrants issued against Mohmoud Khan Achakzai.

CSO: 4600/522

BRIEFS

JUP FOR JOINT DECLARATION--KARACHI, April 9: The JUP was trying to get a declaration signed by all political parties to stick to the 1973 Constitution and to participate only in elections held under that constitution and the rules therein. Political sources told the Muslim that JUP in the light of past experience was not in favour of calling a round table conference as it could be easily sabotaged by the government and the interested quarters. Therefore the JUP has decided to get a declaration signed by all parties and make it public to demonstrate the unanimity of all the parties on the 1973 constitution. The proposed draft of the declaration is: "The signatory political parties do hereby solemnly pledge and declare that they want restoration of 1973 Constitution and will participate in elections, if and when held, for national and provincial assemblies on party basis in accordance with the 1973 Constitution without any amendment, whatsoever." Political circles here believe that so far the JUP has been successful in mustering support for the declaration but its greatest difficulty will be when it faces the Jamaat-e-Islami and PML (Pagara). The JI is suspicious of every move made by the JUP whatever the intentions. Similar is the attitude of JUP towards JI. These circles believe, JUP may also find it very difficult to convince Peer Saheb Pagara about the effectiveness of this move. [Text] [Islamabad THE MUSLIM in English 10 Apr 84 p 6]

CASE AGAINST BUGTI'S SON--QUETTA, April 10: The police have prepared a challan against Salal Akbar Bugti younger son of former Baluchistan Governor Nawab Akbar Bugti, for trial by a military court. He has been charged with possessing unlicensed arms and ammunition. He was detected by airport security force here and handed over to the police for interrogation. On preliminary investigation he failed to produce licence for the rifle and cartridges in his possession. According to his statement to the police, licence for the rifle carried by him was in the name of his father Nawab Akbar Bugti. It may be recalled that accused's father Nawab Bugti is abroad presently undergoing medical treatment. [Text] [Islamabad THE MUSLIM in English 11 Apr 84 p 8]

LAWYERS AGAINST DETENTION--LAHORE, April 10: The Lahore High Court Bar Association has sent a list of 24 detained lawyers to the Ministry of Law and Parliamentary Affairs. These lawyers are presently detained in various jails of the province. It is learnt through reliable sources that the ministry had asked for a list of the detained lawyers. It is believed that ministry has asked for the list after the meeting of the Pakistan Bar Council and the move could lead to their release. [Text] [Islamabad THE MUSLIM in English 11 Apr 84 p 8]

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